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TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF SPITE
Nadav Shoked
ABSTRACT—Spite’s role in property law is garnering much academic
attention. Yet spite remains strikingly misunderstood. Commentators
partaking in the reinvigorated debate over property rights’ nature often
point at the law’s prohibition on spiteful uses of property by owners as
indicating that property law is sensitive to individuals’ goals and attitudes
when distributing powers. This assertion draws on a long line of judicial,
legislative, and scholarly pronouncements to the effect that the prohibition
on spite is an intent-based, subjective test banning acts whose motivation is
malicious. This Article illustrates that this perception is deeply flawed—
descriptively and normatively. Exploring the forgotten history of spite law,
this Article finds that in practice the spite prohibition never policed mental
states. Rather, the spite prohibition was utilized, in different legal subfields
and at different times, to stealthily introduce objective public policy limits
to curb owners’ freedom of action when property law formally accorded
the owners absolute powers. Spite law thereby performed a constant, and
exceptionally important, role in the development of American law: it
blunted the effect of rules sparing owners the need to consider the impacts
of their property uses, and it paved the way for the explicit, and exhaustive,
regulation of property uses that eventually dislodged such rules. The
Article then proceeds to argue that this choice American law made, to
divorce spite’s legal function from the term’s common meaning, is
normatively warranted. Fierce scholarly denunciations of acts spitefully
motivated ignore the illusory nature of the distinction between spiteful and
nonspiteful motivations. This Article demonstrates that, given current
property law’s structure and aims, spiteful acts are also, inevitably and
always, nonspiteful. Property ownership is inherently spiteful; thus, while
certain uses of property can—and must—be deemed unacceptable, property
owners’ motivations for picking those uses cannot.
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of
Law. This Article benefited immensely from the comments and insights of
David Dana, Erin Delaney, Lee Anne Fennell, Michael Frakes, Adam
Green, Morton Horwitz, and Joseph Singer. I am also grateful to Joe
Delich, Sam Trimbach, and Van Whiting for providing outstanding
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Alan Markovitz erected a twelve-foot-high, spotlit, bronze
statue on his Michigan lakefront property. It faced his neighbor’s windows.
That neighbor, Lea Tuohy, was Markovitz’s former wife, and the statue
was shaped as a hand with its middle finger raised.1 Markovitz’s act was
undeniably blunt, but it was not distinctive in intent—many other owners
before and after have sought to annoy their neighbors.2 Markovitz’s
undertaking was noteworthy, nonetheless: other owners aiming to torment
their neighbors normally settle for constructing a fence obstructing those
neighbors’ views.3 Markovitz diverged from this more traditional route

1 David Hopkins, American Directs Large ‘Middle Finger’ Statue at Home of Ex-Wife, TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 18, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10457437/
American-directs-large-middle-finger-statue-at-home-of-ex-wife.html [http://perma.cc/92WW-6NLH];
Update: Orchard Lake Man Erects Giant Sculpture to Flip Off His Neighbor, DEADLINE DETROIT
(Nov. 16, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.deadlinedetroit.com/articles/7248/bloomfield_hills_
man_builds_giant_statue_to_flip_off_his_ex-wife#.VO97w_nF9x0 [http://perma.cc/VX5K-52TV].
2 The most extreme cases involve “spite houses” built solely to annoy neighbors or a local
government—by blocking roads or views—even though they offer little, if anything, by way of
habitability. See, e.g., John Kelly, Answer Man: In Search of Houses That Spite Built, WASH. POST
(Mar.
26,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/25/
AR2006032500903.html [http://perma.cc/HD97-3HTZ].
3 See infra Section II.B.
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since he found it too subtle.4 Unintentionally, however, his choice was also
legally sensible. Had he opted for a fence facing Tuohy’s windows, the
common law could have held him liable.5 As a legal matter, such a fence
could have been deemed motivated by spite and thus a nuisance. Against
the statue facing her windows, on the other hand, Tuohy had no viable legal
recourse.6 As a legal matter, a statue—even one shaped as a middle
finger—cannot be perceived as motivated by actionable spite.
These contrasting results would strike most observers as somewhat
odd. A middle finger statue more easily smacks of spite than a fence, even
when that fence intentionally blocks a neighbor’s lake views. Apparently,
spite in the law does not correspond to the behavior and attitude
conventionally associated with the terms “spiteful” or “spite.” But if legal
spite does not stand for spite, what does it stand for? This Article will, for
the first time, answer this question.
The question respecting spite’s legal function is exceedingly important
because property law’s recognition of spite stands out. The prohibition on
spite, even if laboriously constrained, eliminates an owner’s freedom to
engage in activities on her land that are otherwise—as far as the law is
concerned—wholly uncontroversial. An owner is normally free, for
example, to construct a fence on her land even when that fence interferes
with a neighboring property’s exposure to light and air,7 or its aesthetically
pleasing environs.8 This most basic freedom to build the fence is lost,
however, if the constructing owner acted on spite. Of course, there are
other limits on the owner’s freedom: an owner may be barred, for instance,
from developing her land in a manner that floods neighboring lands;9 or she
may be prohibited from choosing entrants based on race.10 But the curb on
the owner’s freedom instituted here through spite law is still remarkable.
When an American court first recognized spite as a limit to an owner’s
freedom to build, in the case of Burke v. Smith, the dissenting judge was
4
Markovitz explained that he erected the statue as a message to the man with whom Tuohy was
cohabitating: “‘This is about him. This is about him not being a man.’ ‘He broke the Man Code.’ ‘Real
men don’t do that to another guy.’” Hopkins, supra note 1.
5 See Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 841–42 (Mich. 1888).
6 See Wernke v. Halas, 600 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that “tasteless
decoration,” specifically, a toilet seat with paint representing excrement mounted on a pole, “is merely
an aesthetic annoyance” incapable of giving rise to a legal claim).
7 1 AM. JUR. 2D Adjoining Landowners §§ 102–103, at 1005–07 (2005). For a comprehensive
discussion, see infra Section II.B.
8 E.g., Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 500 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he
unpleasant appearance of neighboring property, in and of itself, does not rise to the level of a
nuisance.”).
9 E.g., Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 120 A.2d 4, 10 (N.J. 1956).
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012).
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aghast: “[But] the motives of a party in doing a legal act cannot form the
basis upon which to found a remedy against such party.”11 This laconic
assertion of an elemental property truism should have sufficed, in the
dissenter’s mind, to deflect any legal claim based on spite.
For property law is always agnostic to actors’ intent.12 None of the
other legal checks on an owner’s freedom concerns her motives.13 Yet the
rein spite law places on an owner’s freedom to engage in otherwise
legitimate activities appears to be distinctly based on her subjective goals.
The majority opinion enjoining the fence the defendant constructed in the
pioneering Burke case, stated as much:
What right has the defendant, in the light of the just and beneficent principles
of equity, to [act on his land] . . . simply to gratify his own wicked malice
against his neighbor? None whatever. . . . [N]o man can pollute the
atmosphere, or shut out the light of heaven, for no better reason than that . . .
he . . . wishes to gratify his spite and malice towards his neighbor.14

Thus formulated, spite law illustrates that “the law does sometimes
care about owners’ reasons for deciding, and this fact . . . provides a crucial
insight into the nature of ownership . . . .”15 The insight is crucial because it
inducts a new, and arguably transformational, element into property
theory.16 The major undertaking of the burgeoning scholarship in this field
is the isolation of the nature of property as a distinct legal and social
institution. This task implies the identification of ownership’s outer ambit.
The continued presence of spite doctrine in American law, ostensibly
delineating owners’ sphere of action in correspondence to the
wholesomeness of their feelings, enriches any such discussion. It points at a

11

37 N.W. 838, 845 (Mich. 1888) (Champlin, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 159–60 (Wis. 1997) (ignoring in a
trespass case an owner’s reasoning for not allowing an entrant). Arguably, an exception might be the
necessity defense to trespass. A trespasser will avoid liability if she can show that she acted to prevent
imminent harm. To avail herself of this defense, however, the trespasser must satisfy other requirements
as well; for example, she must have chosen the lesser of two evils, she must have reasonably anticipated
a direct causal relationship between the trespass and the harm to be averted, and she must have had no
legal alternative to trespassing. E.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991). In
light of these diverse—and cumbersome—objective conditions that must be met, see David Dana &
Nadav Shoked, Public, by Necessity, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 341, 366–69 (2014), it is probably
inaccurate to characterize the necessity defense as truly intent-based.
13 Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 641–43 (1988)
(listing the curbs the law places on owners’ freedom).
14 37 N.W. at 842 (majority opinion).
15 Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right,
122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1448 (2013).
16 See infra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
12
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very clear and meaningful limit to ownership that is of a different cast from
those limits normally conceded.17
This reigning understanding of spite’s key normative role hinges on
one core assumption: that spite law tackles an owner’s animus towards her
neighbor. This assumption has never been tested against the actual law and
history—as opposed to rhetoric—of American spite. Spite law has been
taken at its word. Yet as this Introduction already illustrated in its opening
example, that assumption is dubious. If an owner is not allowed to
construct a fence facing a neighboring property because of his spiteful
motivation, but is allowed to construct a middle-finger statue pointed at
that same neighboring property, animated by the same spiteful motivation,
spite law attends to something different from plain spite.
And the nonspiteful middle-finger statue is far from the sole
inconsistency. Anomalies abound. In 1902, for example, the industrialist
and financier Henry Clay Frick insisted that his company’s new Pittsburgh
headquarters tower over, and constantly shadow, the neighboring
skyscraper housing the company of his former partner, now his nemesis,
Andrew Carnegie.18 Still, the project encountered no legal hurdles.19 In
1959, for another example, Ben Novack, owner of Miami Beach’s most
glamorous hotel, the Fontainebleau, was constructing an annex along the
hotel’s property line, thereby blocking sunrays from reaching the adjoining
hotel’s pool.20 That adjoining hotel, the Eden Roc, was owned by Novack’s
former partner, now his nemesis, Harry Mufson; Novack resolved that the
addition’s wall facing the Eden Roc would be blank, made of concrete, and
windowless—other than one small cluster of windows installed in his own
private suite so that he could look down at the Eden Roc’s shaded pool and
gloat.21 The structure became locally known as “the spite wall”22 but still, in
a famed property law decision,23 the Florida court dismissed Eden Roc’s
challenge to it.24
17

See infra Part I.
French Strother, Frick, the Silent: Successor to Mr. Carnegie, Possible Successor to Mr.
Harriman, in 14 THE WORLD’S WORK: A HISTORY OF OUR TIME 8849, 8856 (Walter H. Page ed.,
1907).
19 See id.
20 SETH BRAMSON, IMAGES OF AMERICA: MIAMI BEACH 108 (2005); Joseph Brown, Eden Roc
Hotel Miami Beach: A New Tower that Ends the Feud, S. BEACH MAG. (Jan. 9, 2008),
http://www.southbeachmagazine.com/eden-roc-hotel-miami-beach/ [http://perma.cc/VL4A-6WR6].
21 Brown, supra note 20.
22 Id.
23 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959). The case features prominently in casebooks, for example, THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E.
SMITH, PROPERTY 1013–16 (2d ed. 2012); JOSEPH SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW 367 (6th ed. 2014).
24 Fontainebleau, 114 So. 2d 357.
18
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These examples tentatively indicate the argument that this Article will
methodically establish: the prevailing assumption respecting spite’s legal
nature is flawed. As its American history will make clear, spite, as a limit
to ownership, is not, and never was, truly concerned with owners’
subjective motivations. Spite law is concerned with something else,
something very different from actual spite. Counterintuitively, spite law, I
will argue, traffics in objective—not subjective—values. Rather than
calling on courts to scrutinize owners’ intentions as previous authors
assume, spite law has empowered courts to balance the social values of
different property uses, thereby subverting property rules that formally
granted owners absolute freedom to use their property.
Although when grasped in these terms, spite doctrine ceases to
represent the exceptional case where property outcomes revolve around
mental states, it remains an exceptionally telling element of property law.
Indeed, it emerges from this Article as an even more revelatory common
law component than previously believed. Through the two-hundred-yearlong-and-counting story of spite, a constant of property law crystalizes:
aspirations for absolute protections for owners’ autonomy, free from the
burden of balancing tests characteristic of other legal fields,25 uniformly
failed. Repeatedly, property rules crafted to bestow on owners an
unhindered freedom of action were soon unsettled by judicial action—by
judges falling back on a spite test that was seemingly subjective but
actually enabled courts to engage in objective balancing of interests before
approving an owner’s act. Once this crack opened by spite law widened,
and the relevant absolute owner freedom rule was formally toppled and
replaced by objective balancing tests, the prohibition on spite—which had
originally introduced these tests surreptitiously—lost its utility, and as a
legal doctrine petered out. It no longer expanded to tackle new factual
patterns as they emerged, and thus its reach was irrationally delimited to
specific scenarios already covered. Left behind were islands of supposedly
prohibited spiteful uses—such as the actionable spite fence—which persist
as peculiarities, aberrations given modern property law’s overall design.
This development is hardly lamentable. Quite the opposite: it is
inevitable and normatively desirable. The descriptive argument made by
this Article—that the law never consistently targeted malevolent owners—
will be accompanied by a corresponding normative argument: that the law
should not target malevolent owners. Jurists and commentators who
25 E.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965,
975–80 (2004) (arguing property law differs from tort law since, while the latter focuses on
empowering courts to evaluate “proper use,” property delegates all decisionmaking powers to the
owner).
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unanimously champion spite doctrine as a tool to incorporate sensitivity to
undesirable mental states into property law fail to provide persuasive
reasons for their position. Though the prevalent and forceful statements that
an owner should not be permitted to satisfy her “malice and wickedness”26
or “use her position just in order to harm someone else”27 may appear
intuitive and unassailable, they are out of sync with property’s normative
goals. Property law is a major tool for facilitating the expression of relative
status.28 Through property, owners convey to others the message that those
others do not measure up. Property law could not have banned Frick from
shading Carnegie’s Pittsburgh headquarters, since it would not bar Frick
from constructing his New York mansion, even after the robber baron
allegedly stated that he was doing it to “make Carnegie’s place [located
twenty blocks to the north] look like a miner’s shack.”29 There can be
nothing intrinsically wrong with an owner aiming to upset her neighbor
when she is completely free to venture to distress her neighbor by flaunting
her status, resources, or taste—by flaunting her property—in front of that
neighbor. Spitefulness, or at least the possibility thereof, is inherent to
ownership, and thus an owner cannot be disciplined for acting on spiteful
motivations.
Moreover, any such futile attempt to isolate and chastise spiteful
motivations comes at a steep normative cost. It must divert attention away
from meaningful cost–benefit analysis and towards irrelevant, and vain,
explorations into human motivations. The questions with which property
law ought to be occupied are not: “Is Mr. Markovitz bitter?”; “Is Mr. Smith
venous?”; “Is Mr. Frick petty?”; or “Is Mr. Novack vindictive?” The
question should always be: “Is a statue in Mr. Markovitz’s yard, a fence on
Mr. Smith’s property, a tower for Mr. Frick’s headquarters, or a wall for
Mr. Novack’s hotel, socially beneficial?”
This Article thus pursues two goals: to undermine the current
literature’s assumption that, in American law, spite has operated as a
prohibition on malicious motivations, and to challenge the literature’s
normative stance against such motivations. The Article establishes these
twin contentions as follows. Part I reviews spite doctrine as commonly
perceived and explains why writers believe the doctrine is key to

26

Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 838, 840 (Mich. 1888).
Katz, supra note 15, at 1451.
28 See generally Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2009)
(exploring property’s status-signaling function and that function’s interaction with doctrines of property
law).
29 Christopher Gray, Carnegie vs. Frick: Dueling Egos on Fifth Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2000,
§ 11, at 7.
27
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understanding property rights’ nature. In this context the move many make
to equate the doctrine with the broader European “abuse of right” principle
is surveyed. This dominant descriptive position—that spite represents a
rule disallowing certain motives—is discredited in Part II, which
comprehensively explores, as never done before, spite’s history in
American law. It finds that spite has never functioned as a general doctrine
comparable to an abuse of right principle. Rather, its domain was always
limited to specific subfields. Identifying the disparate property subfields
where spite has manifested itself throughout American history—water law,
land use, support rights, and restraints on alienation—and chronicling its
development in each, Part II finds that in none did the doctrine focus on the
owner’s animus as commonly assumed. Instead it always performed a
different, yet still important, function in the maturation of the legal regime
governing the relevant subfield. Part III then makes the normative case
supporting property law’s refusal to focus on mental states. To refute the
dominant position advocating the interdiction of spiteful acts, Part III
highlights the illusory distinction between a motivation solely to harm
another—a spiteful motivation—and a motivation to derive a benefit—a
nonspiteful motivation. The problem is identified through cases involving
neighbors who are business competitors—mostly found in signage law—
and then generalized, engendering the conclusion that property law must
rely on objective tests of means and effects, rather than subjective tests of
motive.
I.

THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF SPITE’S PLACE IN
PROPERTY LAW

In a world where space is finite, owners are always surrounded by
other owners. Consequently, there are hardly any activities an owner may
engage in on his land that will not affect other owners. If he constructs a
building, other owners’ adjacent lands may lose their exposure to sun or
their soil’s support. If he operates a business, those lands may be saddled
by noise or concomitant traffic. If he drills for oil, those lands may be
deprived of oil or exposed to toxic fumes. Therefore, one of property law’s
most important tasks is to regulate the relationship between neighboring
owners.
Spite doctrine performs this role: it deigns illegitimate certain owner
activities that detrimentally affect a neighboring owner. Hence it is of
undeniable practical significance. It is of even greater normative interest on
account of its relationship to other elements of property law. The
juxtaposition of spite with those other legal components highlights spite’s
alleged uniqueness, but also points at its potential centrality for the
364
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operation of property law. Therefore, after introducing spite doctrine as
commonly read, this Part will explore the work of the many recent writers
who claim that spite law—due to that current reading—represents a much
broader principle inherent to the common law’s idea of ownership. In this
way, this Part sets the stage for the next parts of the Article, which cast
doubt over this understanding of spite and of its theoretical import.
A. Spite Law as Commonly Read
Spite’s role in property law appears straightforward. Though in both
popular imagination and much philosophical thinking property ownership
is associated with freedom,30 in practice property law cannot afford owners
anything resembling absolute freedom, due to the inevitable conflicts
between owners that will ensue.31 Hence property rules are often mainly
concerned not with the freedom of the owner, but rather with setting that
freedom’s contours. They define property rights and place limits on their
exercise to forestall or settle conflicts between owners. Property rules may
prevent the owner from operating a business or drilling for oil; or they may
regulate his capacity to do so by instituting allowable hours of operation,
permissible volume of oil to be pumped, etc. These and similar tasks in
other cases are performed by diverse property doctrines, including nuisance
law, rules respecting the acquisition of property rights, environmental
regulations, and zoning ordinances. Spite is one of these many doctrines
that help draw the sphere of an owner’s freedom: It prohibits the owner
from exercising his freedom in certain ways to protect others.
The substance of the prohibition—the specific owner acts marked out
for censure by spite law—also appears plain and intuitive. As quoted in the
Introduction, when first recognizing spite as a basis for challenging an
owner’s act, the Michigan court unequivocally announced in Burke v.
Smith that nobody has a right to erect a structure for the purpose of injuring
his neighbor.32 Other courts have used similar terms, forcefully depicting
the spite prohibition they thereby introduced as based, as its name implies,
on the owner’s motivation—prohibiting behavior intended solely to annoy
a neighbor.33 That notion of spite doctrine has since become dogma. The
30

See Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 446–53 (2014).
See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16–18 (2000).
32 37 N.W. 838, 842 (Mich. 1888).
33 E.g., Hutcherson v. Alexander, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1968) (“[E]ven a lawful use
of one’s property may constitute a nuisance if it is part of a general scheme to annoy a neighbor and if
the main purpose of the use is to prevent the neighbor from reasonable enjoyment of his own
property.”); Hornsby v. Smith, 13 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1941) (“Thus it is our opinion that malicious use
of property resulting in injury to another is never a ‘lawful use,’ but is in every case unlawful. . . . When
one acting solely from malevolent motives does injury to his neighbor, to call such conduct the exercise
31
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leading treatise states as much,34 and so do the Restatement35 and the
American Law Reports.36 Scholars of all methodological and normative
stripes concur: spite is a prime example of the law “mak[ing] the
entitlement to engage in a behavior depend on one’s reason for wishing to
engage in it,”37 of the law “treat[ing] an act not otherwise wrongful as
wrongful when it is motivated by enmity.”38 Writers conceive spite doctrine
as straightforward: it applies a “motive test,” striking down acts prompted
by disfavored intentions.39
Yet it is this straightforward nature of the doctrine that also renders it
unique among the doctrines employed to arbitrate conflicts between
neighbors. Other such doctrines detail attributes a party’s act must count—
for example, adverse possession grants title to that party which possessed
land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely for a statutorily set
period of time.40 Or they appraise the harm the act inflicts; for example,
nuisance law bars a party from substantially and unreasonably interfering
with another’s use of land.41 Such doctrines might, on occasion, inquire into
the actor’s knowledge of his act or its harms—for example, some
jurisdictions require that the adverse possessor mistakenly believe the land
to be his,42 and negligence liability requires actionable harm to be

of an absolute legal right is a perversion of terms. . . . The use of one’s own property for the sole
purpose of injuring another is not a right that a good citizen would desire nor one that a bad citizen
should have.”).
34 9 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.03[4], at 64-20 (Michael Allan Wolf
ed., 2000) (“Where the defendant’s conduct is motivated solely by malice, the use is deemed
unreasonable . . . .”).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“An intentional invasion of
another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm is significant and the
actor’s conduct is (a) for the sole purpose of causing harm to the other; or (b) contrary to common
standards of decency.”).
36 Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Fence as Nuisance, 80 A.L.R.3d 962, § 2[a], at 967 (1977) (“The
importance of the factor of malicious motive in the erection of a fence which harms or harasses a third
party, usually an adjoining landowner, has caused much litigation and given rise to a diversity of
viewpoints among courts of different jurisdictions. . . . The courts in other jurisdictions have adopted
the view, which seems to be emerging as the dominant one, that fences which are erected from
malicious motives are subject to abatement or other appropriate remedies where they cause injury.”).
37 Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1454 (2009).
38 Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 234 (2002).
39 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 97 (1979); Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1667–68. (2011); Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV.
421, 448 (1992); Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for “Abuse” of an Easement:
Moving Toward Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 933,
960 (2008).
40 E.g., Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 781–82 (Alaska 2000).
41 E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696–97 (Cal. 1996).
42 E.g., Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa 1982).
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predictable.43 But the focus of all these doctrines is always the act and its
harm.
The act’s motivation is never considered. For determining an actor’s
liability in private litigation, intentions are supposedly irrelevant. A famous
maxim of the common law holds that “[m]alicious motives make a bad act
worse, but they cannot make that a wrong which in its own essence is
lawful.”44 Property law is even more sanguine in its refusal to ponder
motives. As Justice Holmes once explained, while in many legal fields an
act’s legitimacy may depend on the actor’s goal, that is not the case where
the act challenged is a use of land.45
The doctrine of spite, grounded as it seemingly is in a motive test,
plainly flies in the face of this assertion. It is thus a conspicuous exception
to the general patterns of property law. As such, it has always induced
scholarly interest.
This inevitable attention the doctrine of spite garners has recently
grown further still, thanks to developments in the theoretical literature.
Influential authors have begun to argue that spite must be conceived as
more than mere exception to the overall structure and priorities of property
law. Instead, they find it emblematic of that structure and those priorities. If
property law’s logic is accurately perceived, they argue, spite, as a doctrine
explicitly relying on a motive test, is not unique but pivotal. For them spite
represents a broader, indeed all-encompassing, restriction on owners’
rights. That restriction is the principle of abuse of right.
B.

Spite and the Abuse of Right Principle

The abuse of right principle is best illustrated by a celebrated French
case.46 Adolphe Clément-Bayard and Jules Coquerel were neighbors.47
Clément-Bayard constructed on his land a hangar to store his airship.48
Coquerel constructed on his land tall iron spikes to interfere with ClémentBayard’s attempts at flying.49 When Clément-Bayard sought to have them
43

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“In order that an act
may be negligent it is necessary that the actor should realize that it involves a risk of causing harm to
some interest of another . . . .”).
44 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 690 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1879); see also Allen v. Flood,
[1898] AC 1 (HL) 92 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[T]he existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act
which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil wrong for which reparation is due.”).
45 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904).
46 Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], Aug. 3, 1915, D.P. I 1917, 79.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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removed, Coquerel argued that the spikes merely expressed his right to use
his own land.50 Nonetheless, the French court ruled against him in 1915.51 It
reckoned that by building a structure whose purpose was to injure his
neighbor, Coquerel abused his property right.52 And no property owner,
proclaimed the court, is entitled to abuse his property right.53
Since the early twentieth century,54 the doctrine announced in this case
has been ingrained into civil systems’ property law.55 European officials
still argue that it plays a basic, and vital, role in private law by assuring that
law dispenses “true justice.”56 For all its centrality in European law,
however, the doctrine has never been endorsed by an American
lawmaker.57 A staple of civil law thinking, it remains markedly absent from
the common law thinking. This contrast constitutes a key distinction
between the idea of property in the common law and the civil law’s notion
of property.58

50 See id. This right was based on Articles 544 and 552 of the Code civil. CODE CIVIL [C.
CIV.][CIVIL CODE] arts. 544, 552 (Fr.).
51 Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Supreme Court for Judicial Matters], Aug. 3, 1915, D.P. I 1917, 79.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 The doctrine can be traced to two cases decided almost at the same time by two different French
courts, Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Colmar, 1e civ., May 2, 1855, D.P. II 1856, 9
(regarding the matter of Doerr against Keller), and Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Lyon,
1e civ., Apr. 18, 1856, D.P. II 1856, 199 (regarding the commune of Saint-Galmier in the matter of
Badoit against André).
55 See, e.g., CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 833 (It.), translated in 3 THE ITALIAN CIVIL
CODE AND COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION 5 (Mario Beltramo et al. trans., 2007) (“The owner cannot
perform acts that have no other purpose than that of harming or causing annoyance to others.”);
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], AUG. 18, 1896, § 226 (Ger.), translated in THE
GERMAN CIVIL CODE: TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND
APPENDICES 51 (Chung Hui Wang trans., 1907) (“The exercise of a right which can only have the
purpose of causing injury to another is unlawful.”); BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [CIVIL CODE] art.
3:13(1) (Neth.), translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE NETHERLANDS 435 (Hans Warendorf et al. trans.,
2009) (“The holder of a right may not exercise it to the extent that its exercise constitute an abuse.”).
See generally Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389
(2002) (examining the doctrine’s origin and significance).
56 See Catherine Lalumiere, Sec’y Gen. of the Council of Eur., Speech at the Nineteenth Colloquy
on European Law (Nov. 1989), in ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND EQUIVALENT CONCEPTS 9, 10 (Council of
Eur. ed., 1990).
57 See Byers, supra note 55, at 395. Louisiana, a civil law system, may count as an exception. A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Civil Liability for Abuse of Right: Something Old, Something New . . ., 54 LA. L. REV.
1173, 1173 (1994). The common law case usually cited as rejecting the theory is Mayor of Bradford v.
Pickles, [1895] AC 587 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). For a discussion of the case, see infra note 102
and accompanying text.
58 See H.C. Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 22, 30, 43–44 (1933); Richard
O’Sullivan, Abuse of Rights, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 61, 65, 71–73 (1955) (“In France, it seems that
the doctrine of Abus des Droits finds its model if not its source in the détournement de pouvoir of
French administrative law. It is not politic in England to waste too much sympathy on public local
authorities and ministerial departments.”).
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Unless, that is, the contrast is mere formality. And for many recent
authors, that is precisely its nature—due to the doctrine of spite. While
American law, unlike its European counterpart, never explicitly adopted the
doctrine of abuse of right, it has, they argue, imported it under a different
label: spite law.59 Judicial pronouncements give credence to this claim.
Although American judges scrupulously refrained from referring to the
abuse of right doctrine by name, the early courts recognizing spite
repeatedly cited the practices of European jurisprudence as models for
prohibiting misuses of an owner’s freedom. In Burke v. Smith, the judges
instituting the spite rule asserted that the civil law’s approach should
inspire the common law since it recognizes in this regard the “moral law.”60
Another court adopting spite doctrine two decades later went further to
claim that it was banning spite to bring to these shores a European doctrine,
for:
On this subject, if need be, we will do better to follow the pandects of the
heathen Romans, whose jurists have inculcated a doctrine more consistent
with the teachings of Him whom they permitted to be crucified, than to be
governed by the principles of the common law as expounded by some
Christian courts and text writers.61

Thereafter, for more than a hundred years now, American spite has
supposedly amounted to the “functional equivalent” of the European abuse
of right doctrine.62 So much so that some contend that though originating in
the civil law, the abuse of right doctrine “took root in the common law
legal systems.”63 The prohibition on spite embodies, we are told, the wider
civil law category of abuse of right—of actions normally permitted but

59 Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 40 (1995);
James Charles Smith, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Law of Neighbors, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 757, 775–76 (2011).
60 37 N.W. 838, 839–40 (Mich. 1888).
61 Barger v. Barringer, 66 S.E. 439, 442 (N.C. 1909).
62 Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS
L.J. 687, 696 (2010).
63 E.g., Amnon Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards,
42 RUTGERS L.J. 81, 136 (2010). Commentators argue that the same process took place in other
common law systems. In England, spite supposedly served as a replacement for abuse of right in late
nineteenth-century common law. See MICHAEL TAGGART, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ABUSE OF RIGHTS
IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 65 (2002); G.H.L. Fridman, Motive in the English Law of Nuisance, 40 VA. L.
REV. 583, 586 (1954) (noting that intentional nuisance is central to the discussion of abuse of rights in
the common law). The same has been said in Canada. Hamar Foster, Note, Abuse of Rights—Civil
Law—Legal Reasoning: Bradford v. Pickles Revisited, 8 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 343, 348–50 (1973)
(“[I]n so far as a malicious or improper motive is relevant to the determination of a legal right in our
law, we probably will now reach the same result as those jurisdictions which have the doctrine [of
abuse of rights].”).
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prohibited when motivated by malice alone.64 Spite explicitly and directly
targets “animus” situations and hence it has proven a convenient, and
uncontroversial, conduit for injecting the abuse of right doctrine into the
common law.65 Consequently, as one scholar observed, the common law
lacks the proclamations against unjust abuse of rights typical of continental
codes, yet “it should not be thought that the common law provides no
remedy for such wrongs. There is ample provision in the present law . . .
for the control of activities envisaged by the continental codes.”66 Similarly,
a recent, and prominent, article argues that while the common law formally
spurned the European general tort of abuse of right, “[w]hat we see instead
is a role for a principle of abuse of . . . right.”67
The presence of this principle, expressed and enforced by the spite
prohibition, is important not merely because it bridges the gap between
common law jurisprudence and civil law jurisprudence. For many writers it
is key because it unveils a fundamental quality of property in American
law.68 The legal system’s recognition of a principle of abuse of right
implies a certain view of the powers of the owner, a view deviating from
that traditionally ascribed to the common law. The common law has always
been associated with an expansive reading of the owner’s powers.69 While
English adages celebrating the owner as holder of absolute powers were
pronounced outdated more than a century ago,70 many still believe that in
64

Strang, supra note 39, at 960.
See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, J. TORT L., Oct. 2011, art. 3, at 61,
http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle.fullcontentlink:pdfeventlink/$002fj$002fjtl.2011.4.2$002fjtl.
2011.4.2.1114$002fjtl.2011.4.2.1114.pdf?format=INT&t:ac=j$002fjtl.2011.4.2$002fjtl.2011.4.2.1114$
002fjtl.2011.4.2.1114.xml [http://perma.cc/QVU5-P7BS].
66 Fridman, supra note 63, at 586. Some argue that results reached elsewhere through the abuse of
right doctrine are accomplished in American law through tools beyond spite, such as equity or, in some
states, prima facie torts. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1049–51 (2011) (discussing equity); Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 235–36
(discussing prima facie torts).
67 Katz, supra note 15, at 1449. For a persuasive critique of this attempt to extend the abuse of right
principle beyond “animus” (or spite) situations, see Fennell, supra note 65, at 61.
68 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 15, at 1448.
69 Julio Cueto-Rua, Abuse of Rights, 35 LA. L. REV. 965, 967 (1975) (“In England and the United
States, a different attitude has prevailed. What may be called rather a strict interpretation of ownership
and contractual rights has led the courts to accept, and to provide judicial protection to, actions taken by
owners . . . .”).
70 The most famous adage was made by Blackstone, who defined property as “that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *2. With the rise of realism, this position was just as famously critiqued by Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913). During the twentieth century, Hohfeld’s theory became conventional wisdom.
See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
65
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the common law, those powers that the owner does hold are interpreted
broadly.71 Hence once an owner has a property right respecting others, he
can enforce that right against all others.72 That is, he need not explain to
others his reasons for using his right.73
The existence of an abuse of right principle undermines this traditional
argument about American property law. By imposing such a principle
through spite doctrine the law clearly states that the holder of a right is not
automatically entitled to use it for any purpose he desires. As the right
cannot be abused, the owner may only use it for certain reasons: those the
law recognizes as legitimate.74 In the eyes of many, this requirement that
the owner’s goals correspond to the goals the law has set for ownership
complicates the common law’s notion of property. It transforms, so it has
been argued, ownership into a form of office holding.75 Alternatively, and
perhaps more modestly, it has been characterized as concretizing an antiopportunism norm affixed into property law.76
The specific details of these innovative accounts of property raise
engrossing philosophical and normative questions, many of which will be
engaged later in Part III, where the justifications for condemning spite will
be examined—and challenged. Regardless of their substantive merit,
however, these new descriptions of ownership have amplified the
significance of the legal category of spite for theoretical discussions of
property. These works revise our understanding of property because they
judge spite to incarnate, or at least manifest, a broader principle of abuse of
right. Once the role of that principle in the law is acknowledged, these
writers explain, the legitimacy of an owner’s act can no longer be imagined
as derived only from his powers as owner. It is also tied to the legitimacy
of his motives.
Always a source of fascination as an exception to the general patterns
of property law, the role spite plays in debates over property theory has
thereby expanded now that it is fashioned as outlining those patterns. This
transformation in scholarly attitude has been reached following a
71 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 29–30, 34, 65–66 (1996); J.E. Penner, The
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 737 (1996).
72 For a discussion of the in rem nature of property rights, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
73 Avihay Dorfman, Private Ownership and the Standing to Say So, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 402, 403
(2014).
74 See Katz, supra note 15, at 1450–51.
75 Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property Rights
Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029, 2043–45 (2012).
76 See Smith, supra note 66, at 1050 (arguing that through equity the common law imposes the antiopportunism norm, which in the civil law is embodied in the abuse of right concept).
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reevaluation of the patterns of property law—not of spite law. The reading
of that doctrine has remained constantly stable. Indeed, it is this traditional
story of spite that makes the doctrine’s current equation with an abuse of
right principle tenable. New commentators and old commentators, judges
and thinkers, have always concurred: spite introduces a subjective test,
scrutinizing the owner’s goal before condoning his act. Unfortunately, as
will be established next, they are all simply wrong.
II. AMERICAN SPITE: SPITE’S ACTUAL HISTORY AND ROLE IN
AMERICAN LAW
Part I reviewed the current understanding of spite, highlighting its
theoretical prominence. As seen, spite is perceived as a prohibition against
owners acting on their lands to aggrieve their neighbors rather than to
benefit themselves. Any act an owner may otherwise engage in on her land
will be banned if her motive for engaging in the act is deplorable. This
reading consists of two elements: (1) the prohibition on spite is general,
and (2) it revolves around mental states.77 This Part will investigate the
history and function of spite in American law and conclude that neither of
these two elements survives scrutiny.
The current reading’s first element—the assertion some make to the
effect that the prohibition on spite is general—is disproved by the fractured
American story of spite. As reported in Part I, commentators and courts
have been prone to majestic pronouncements to the effect that “malicious
use of property resulting in injury to another is never a ‘lawful use.’”78
Such rhetoric has never been backed, however, by legal action. When
deciding cases where owners maliciously used property resulting in injury
to another, courts generally ruled for the offending owners, stating
repeatedly that a counterparty’s motives cannot form the basis for founding
a right.79 Thus, in examples spanning the centuries, courts refused to find a
cause of action when owners placed cameras to survey and annoy
neighbors;80 sealed emergency exits and disconnected water lines supplying

77 E.g., Hornsby v. Smith, 13 S.E.2d 20, 24 (Ga. 1941) (“We know of no statute or other rule of law
in this State that confers upon an individual a right to maliciously injure another, regardless of what
method may be employed to inflict such injury.” (emphasis added)).
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Kuzniak v. Kozminski, 65 N.W. 275, 276 (Mich. 1895); Allen v. Kinyon, 1 N.W. 863,
865 (Mich. 1879); Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583, 591 (1854); Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Pa. 467,
471 (1874); S. Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505, 508 (1854).
80 Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 325–26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). But see Blevins v. Sorrell,
589 N.E.2d 438, 439–40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (appearing to find a cause of action in a similar situation,
but not detailing that cause or a reasoning).
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neighbors’ sprinkler system to force them to sell;81 cut off neighbors’ gas
supply wantonly;82 or, in myriad cases, constructed buildings to spite their
neighbors in varied ways,83 sometimes keeping the building in a vile state,84
at other times erecting it at an objectionable size,85 or with a cheap
character,86 and at still other times endowing it with a particularly offensive
design element.87 In all these instances affronted neighbors’ lawsuits failed.
Throughout the last two hundred years courts would only penalize a
malicious property use if that type of use fell into one of the very few
categories of uses to which spite law applied.
Spite is recognized, or was recognized at some time, in four lone
property law subfields as grounds for enjoining a property use: water law
(the “spite well”), land use (the “spite fence”), support rights, and restraints
on alienation. This Part will review the history of spite in each of these four
subfields in this order, which corresponds to the chronological sequence of
spite’s legal appearance. The subfields of support rights and restraints on
alienation will be discussed jointly since, in both, references to spite rarely
went beyond dicta.
The findings will show that in the two subfields where spite did play a
major role—water law and land use—spite followed similar paths. It was
introduced by courts (or, on rarer occasions, legislatures) struggling with a
common law rule affording the owner absolute freedom of action. Courts
grew doubtful of that rule’s wisdom, but, for diverse practical reasons,
were first unwilling to renounce it. Hence they maintained the rule, but
supplemented it with a spite exception. Though nominally entailing an
examination of the owner’s intent when acting, in reality this exception
inserted into legal analysis an objective balancing of the costs and benefits
of the owner’s act. In this manner, the spite exception served to spell the
demise of the absolute-owner-freedom rule and to announce the arrival of a
balancing test. Once, in due course, such a test was fully instated in the
relevant subfield—water law or land use—the spite exception lost its
utility, and, as a legal doctrine, fizzled out. In the other two subfields—
support rights and restraints on alienation—where, to begin with, spite
amounted to merely a minor legal element, it inevitably followed a more
attenuated version of this pattern. But there, too, it never instituted a
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Randall v. Federated Retail Holdings, Inc., 429 F.3d 784, 786, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2005).
McCune v. Norwich City Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521, 524 (1862).
E.g., Biber v. O’Brien, 32 P.2d 425, 428–29 (Cal. 1934); Kuzniak, 65 N.W. at 276.
White v. Bernhart, 241 P. 367, 368 (Idaho 1925) (the spiteful moving of a dilapidated building).
Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292, 295–96 (1883).
Id.
Hawkins v. Sanders, 8 N.W. 98, 98 (Mich. 1881) (discussing an awning).
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meaningful motive-based criterion to assess owners’ activities. This
common characteristic of the four histories of spite to be unraveled now
upends the second element in spite law’s conventional reading: the maxim
that spite has served to inject a subjective test into property law by
prohibiting owners from acting when their intent is solely to harm others.
A. Spite in Water Law
Water law was the first property subfield to carve out a special rule for
spiteful acts. Specifically, spite became a meaningful category in
nineteenth-century cases stipulating landowners’ rights to percolating
waters.88 These waters are located underneath the land and, since they
represent a valuable resource, the landowner often seeks to pump them.89
Until the nineteenth century’s middle decades, the common law lacked
rules regulating owners’ rights to these desirable waters. The lacuna is
surprising, since the nature of underground water renders conflicts over its
use inevitable.90 As one of the first courts to confront a percolating waters
problem explained, “[W]ater, like air, is of such a nature that no one can
have an exclusive right in it. . . . The right of each is more or less dependent
upon that of his neighbour.”91 Like air, water travels. If an owner digs a
well on her land and pumps water, her neighbor will have less water
flowing under her land, and thus a lessened ability to pump water herself.
Water is also hardly traceable. Since the water located under the owner’s
land today was under her neighbor’s land yesterday, and will be under
another neighbor’s land tomorrow, declaring the landowner the water’s
owner is pointless.92 Law thus never consistently assigned property rights in
percolating waters in this fashion.93 Instead, it regulated owners’ ability to
88

Other cases covered by water law are those involving streams and surface water.
Due to early and unsophisticated science, underground water fell into one of two categories in
the common law. Waters either formed part of underground known streams, whence they were subject
to the legal regime applicable to surface streams, or their underwater source was unknown, in which
case they were defined as percolating and were governed by the rules discussed here. Nourse v.
Andrews, 255 S.W. 84, 86 (Ky. 1923). The presumption was that underground waters are percolating,
unless shown to be supplied by a known stream. Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080, 1081 (Iowa 1903).
90 As late as 1902, the California court incredulously complained that the doctrine had not
developed much and that not enough had been written about percolating water in casebooks. Katz v.
Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663, 665 (Cal. 1902), rev’d on reh’g, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903). A year later a treatise
writer also observed that, “The law with respect to rights in percolating waters was not developed until
a comparatively recent period.” 3 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
§ 935, at 2710 (1903).
91 Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 533 (1855).
92 See Canada v. City of Shawnee, 64 P.2d 694, 699 (Okla. 1936).
93 The terminology courts historically used is slightly more nuanced. Since the common law
prioritized possession over ownership, the landowner would be treated as the water’s owner if she
possessed it. The landowner could not be viewed as possessing the water underneath her soil until she
89
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draw such waters.94 That is, rather than deigning the landowner as the
owner of the water underneath her land, the law designated the landowner
who brought water to the surface as the owner of the withdrawn waters.
Hence, the legal question in percolating water law is this: to what extent
does a landowner hold the right to withdraw waters from underneath her
land so as to thereby become their owner?
The common law’s original answer was simple: to a limitless extent.
The first English court to adjudicate such a dispute stated, in the 1843 case
of Acton v. Blundell,95 that the landowner enjoyed an absolute privilege to
draw water, regardless of any interference with other landowners’ ability to
draw water.96 The decision was almost immediately quoted in approval by
American courts.97 Indeed, the Massachusetts court had reached the same
conclusion even earlier, in 1836.98 The rule became known as the Acton
Rule, and for a few decades, its application or wisdom was hardly
questioned.99 The rationale cited was underground waters’ singularly
opaque character.100 Unlike water flowing through streams, the source and
path of water percolating underground were unknowable.101 Hence, unlike
rules governing surface stream waters, which required courts to intervene
and fairly distribute use rights between neighbors, the rule respecting
percolating waters could do no more than leave each owner free to pump.
As any regulatory scheme for underground water was unworkable, the
Acton Rule could admit no exceptions. The English courts clarified as
actually physically took possession by pumping it. Hence the landowner did not hold ownership in the
water, but rather, by reason of her ownership of land touching the water, she held rights of use, which,
as against those not owning such land, are in large measure exclusive. See the discussion in 1 SAMUEL
WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 711–12, at 779–81 (3d ed. 1911).
94 For example, the Idaho statute adopted in 1899 provides that the right in water acquired by
appropriating water is “[t]he right to the use.” Act of Feb. 25, 1899, H.B. No. 183, § 2, 1899 Idaho Sess.
Laws 380 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE § 42-103 (2015)). The code also provides “the right to
the use of . . . waters . . . shall not be considered as being a property right in itself . . . .” IDAHO CODE
§ 42-101 (2015).
95 (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324.
96 Id. at 1235; 12 M. & W. at 353–54.
97
See, e.g., Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 309–10 (1871); City of Greencastle v. Hazelett, 23 Ind.
186, 189 (1864); New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112, 114 (1860); Frazier v. Brown,
12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio
1984); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 532–34 (1855). Nineteenth-century treatise writers listed the
rule as a given. See, e.g., COOLEY, supra note 44, at 690; JOHN GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
WATERS, INCLUDING RIPARIAN RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATERS TIDAL AND
INLAND § 280 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1883); JOHN B. MINOR, 3 INSTITUTES OF COMMON AND
STATUTE LAW 18 (Richmond, 2d ed. 1876).
98 Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117, 123 (1836).
99 See Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 541–43 (1850); Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 235 (N.Y.
Gen. Term 1855); Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514, 519 (1863).
100 E.g., Roath, 20 Conn. at 541; Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311; MINOR, supra note 97, at 18.
101 Haldeman, 45 Pa. at 519.
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much in the Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles case,102 where a landowner sunk
a shaft to divert water away from springs on which the neighboring city
relied.103 His goal was to force the city to buy his land or pay him for the
water.104 Still, the English court decided that, because the Acton Rule was
absolute, Pickles’s malicious—or extortionist—intent was irrelevant.105
But while, as noted, American courts had almost unanimously adopted
the Acton Rule,106 most rejected the Mayor of Bradford holding.107 They
thereby created, for the first time in American law, a spite-based exception
to a property rule. Yet the momentous arrival of spite on the scene of
American law had surprisingly little to do with spite, and much to do with
water law. The reasoning courts employed for introducing the spite
exception evinces that the exception can only be understood against the
broader context of courts’ growing disaffection with the rule granting
owners an absolute privilege to draw percolating waters, rather than
disaffection with malevolent well diggers.108
As the nineteenth century progressed, more and more American courts
were struck by the Acton Rule’s rigidity. The rule was exceptional: in all
other property law subfields—including other elements of the law
governing water—an owner’s right could be adjusted to protect
neighbors.109 Such adjustments were necessary, the Pennsylvania court
explained in a percolating water case, since:
The beneficent Being who created the earth, and gave man dominion over it,
imposed on him the duty of doing to others as he would that they should do to
him. Upon this high moral obligation rests the legal one which requires every
102 [1895] AC 587 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). For a discussion of the case’s importance, see
TAGGART, supra note 63.
103 [1895] A.C. at 589.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 591–92.
106 New Hampshire represented the exception. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Brown & Bros. v. Illius, 27 Conn. 84, 96 (1858); Springfield Waterworks Co. v.
Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74, 82 (1895); Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 144–45 (App. Div.
1897); Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 535–36 (1855).
108 See W.L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YALE L.J. 174, 175 (1919) (noting courts’
disaffection with the Acton Rule they were applying). An early twentieth-century treatise writer also
noted as much. 3 HENRY FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 935, at 2710–13
(1903).
109 See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663, 666 (Cal. 1903) (“Proprietary rights are limited by the
common interests of others . . . . This proposition is generally recognized, but for some reason has not
always been recognized by the courts when considering the subject of percolating water, although all
rights in respect to water are peculiarly within its province.”), rev’d on reh’g, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903);
Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 575 (1862) (“[T]he injury [in both surface water and
percolating water cases] is the same, produced in the same general way, and by the same cause, because
of a difference, not in the nature or effects of the water, but merely in its immediate and not necessarily
its ultimate source? Such distinctions and such results do not commend themselves to our judgment.”).
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one so to use his own privileges as not to injure the rights of others. In all the
relations of social life, it is the interest and duty of each to respect the
privileges of others.110

The Acton Rule was this duty’s opposite. And yet, unwillingly, the
Pennsylvania court had to follow it, not for principled reasons, but for
reasons of “public convenience.”111 The practical rationale behind the rule
was irrefutable: “[T]he difficulty in ascertaining the fact of [a] violation [of
the neighbor’s right to percolating water], as well as the extent of it, would
be insurmountable.”112
Percolating waters’ ways remained mysterious. The Pennsylvania
court, alongside its peers, thus found itself in a predicament: it was
enforcing a rule of whose fairness it entertained grave doubts, but whose
practical underpinnings were undisputable.113 The specific problem
presented by the English Mayor of Bradford case offered a convenient way
out. While subterranean waters’ unknowable nature necessitated the
otherwise unfortunate absolute privilege rule set in cases like Acton, it did
not necessitate the refusal to recognize an intent-based exception in cases
like Mayor of Bradford. Courts could not discern the nature and flow of
underground percolating waters; they supposedly could, however, discern
the nature and flow of owners’ motives.114 Through this reasoning, most,
though not all,115 American courts instituted a spite exception to the Acton
Rule.116
For the first time, spite was recognized as carrying legal repercussions
in American property law. As formally announced, the malicious intent
exception to the Acton Rule would bar an owner from digging a “spite
well”: a neighbor, normally powerless to stop the owner from drawing
water, could halt her if the owner dug the well with the specific purpose of
harming that neighbor. The spite exception was to oblige courts to
110

Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 535.
Id.
112
Id. at 532.
113 E.g., Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230, 234–35 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1855); see also Wiggins v. Brazil
Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 966 (Ind. 1983) (explaining that by the late nineteenth century the
only remaining rationale for the rule was “to relieve courts of the responsibility of decision making
during an era when there was little scientific knowledge regarding hydrology”).
114 See Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 535.
115 A few courts insisted on spite’s irrelevance. E.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311–12
(1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984); Chatfield v. Wilson,
28 Vt. 49, 57 (1855); Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354, 356 (Wis. 1903), overruled by State v. Michels
Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974).
116 See Summers, supra note 108, at 175–76 (noting that spite became the rule’s most prominent
exception). By analogy, one court applied this approach to disputes over oil, banning a spite oil well.
Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guar. Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211–12 (1919).
111
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investigate the digging owner’s motivations. Yet from the time of its
introduction, courts did not actually treat the exception as opportunity to
engage in such analysis. Other than in one case, findings about the owner’s
intent never grounded a ruling respecting a well’s spiteful nature.117 Instead,
a court’s conclusion that spite was present in, or absent from, the
defendant’s decision to dig was reached following a comparison of the
social utility of the defendant’s use of the water to the social utility of the
plaintiff’s use. The Pennsylvania ruling first instituting the spite exception
is illustrative. Rather than exploring the defendant mining company’s
subjective motivations, it compared mining’s social worth to the social
worth of the plaintiff’s use of the disputed waters for his tannery
business.118
Such sidestepping of intent tests is most glaring in cases where
subjective spite’s presence was unquestionable. In one Virginia case, the
litigants were neighbors operating competing resorts.119 They had
previously been embroiled in lengthy and acrimonious boundary disputes,
focusing on a water source straddling their lots’ border.120 After courts had
ruled that the source belonged to the plaintiff, the defendant decided to
draw the water away through a pump interfering with the water’s course.121
The court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that the defendant was
motivated by malice when installing the pump;122 still it ruled that the
Acton Rule’s spite exception was of no avail. The findings respecting the
defendant’s actual spite were “irrelevant.”123 The only finding that mattered
was that he was not wasting the water.124
In another extreme case,125 where the plaintiff actually prevailed, the
analysis proceeded similarly. The defendant had placed a pump on land
adjoining his former employer’s land.126 He instructed the installers, “I
want you to get me a good pump and put in there, and I will sink old Pluto
[his neighbor’s spring] to hell.”127 Once the pump was in place, and after he
had learned that the plaintiff’s spring had ceased to flow, the defendant
117 The sole exception is St. Amand v. Lehman, 47 S.E. 949 (Ga. 1904). But the case dealt with
streaming water not subject to the Acton Rule to begin with.
118 Wheatley, 25 Pa. at 535–36.
119 Miller v. Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27, 27 (Va. 1901).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 29.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 32.
125 Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904).
126 Id. at 850.
127 Id. at 851.
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rejoiced, “We have got her down; she has gone to hell,” and thereafter
announced to the plaintiff, “We are pumping you dry. We will make you
break your back dipping after that water.”128 In the ensuing litigation, the
Indiana court ruled for the plaintiff relying on the spite exception to the
Acton Rule, but it did not base the decision on the defendant’s spiteful
statements; rather the determinative factor was the finding that the
defendant was drawing waters “without a real necessity therefor.”129
In other cases as well, the subjective inquiry into the owner’s intent
that the spite exception supposedly mandated was transformed into an
objective exploration into the social worth of the owner’s use of the
contested waters. Ostensibly employing the spite exception, courts
diverged from the strict Acton Rule to block owners from pumping water
and selling it,130 putting the water to “artificial” rather than “natural” uses,131
or exhausting all the water from land in the vicinity.132
Most commonly, as in the Virginia and Indiana cases cited, spite was
invoked to stop owners from digging wells and wasting the water
procured.133 Indeed, in the era’s decisions, the term spite subtly morphed
into the term waste.134 As one court announced in a case where the
defendant diverted water from underneath her neighbor’s land into an
unused creek: “[T]he intent with which [the act was] exercised would be
immaterial. . . . The important intimation to which we wish to direct
attention is that with respect to the beneficial use.”135 Similarly, when a
plaintiff was denied waters he had used to quench the city’s needs, the
court, in reliance on the spite exception, ruled against the defendant who
diverted said waters into a sewer, but not before announcing that the
decision was made “irrespective and independent of [the defendant’s]
motive.”136 The defendant’s motive—which the court admitted could easily
be described as malicious137—was immaterial. What mattered was that the
defendant wasted the water while the plaintiff was trying to put it to a

128

Id.
Id. at 852.
130 Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 46 N.Y.S. 141, 144, 148 (App. Div. 1897).
131 Willis v. City of Perry, 60 N.W. 727, 729 (Iowa 1894).
132 Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 645–46 (N.Y. 1900).
133 E.g., Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 908–09 (Minn. 1903).
134 See Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74, 82 (1895); Pence v. Carney,
52 S.E. 702, 705 (W. Va. 1905).
135 Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080, 1082 (Iowa 1903).
136 Stillwater, 93 N.W. at 909.
137 Id.
129
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valuable use.138 The spite exception to the Acton Rule was indifferent to the
owner’s mental state; the owner “has no right to waste [the water], whether
through malice or indifference.”139
In disputes over percolating waters, the late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century courts, having introduced—for the first time in American
history—spite as a meaningful legal category, developed a legal idea of
spite sharing little with the common notion of spite, or with the spite
exception’s purported goal. So much so that one lower court was scolded
for basing an actionable spite finding on the defendant’s intent and his
fraught relationship with the plaintiff.140 In accordance with the nature of
the Acton Rule’s spite exception as explicated in previous cases, which
never, the higher court insisted, were concerned with subjective spite, the
lower court should have considered general social welfare, and “for reasons
of public policy the plaintiff was precluded from asserting an act to be
maliciously done.”141
Such rulings came close to an overt avowal that spite law did not
relate to spite, and one court indeed proceeded to affirm as much. Unable to
ignore the reality, as opposed to the rhetoric, of prior decisions, the Iowa
court in 1920 reached a startling—and for this Article’s discussion,
remarkable—conclusion. It proclaimed that in law, spite did not mean
spite. The court distinguished “express malice” from “malice in the law”;
for the latter to exist, the former need not be present. Reading cases from
Iowa and elsewhere, the court noted:
That malice in law is referred to rather than express malice is made clear
because, for instance, the diversion [of percolating water] has been held to be
actionable where the harm was caused by negligence . . . . And [another case]
strongly indicates that the fact that waste is being committed to the injury of
another will of itself invoke the powers of the chancery court.142

Due to this distinction, the Iowa court deemed the well it confronted in that
case a spite well, despite malice’s absence.143 The defendant was using the
water “to supply his hogs with drink and wallowing places, while the
138 Id. at 908–09; see also Springfield Waterworks, 62 Mo. App. at 82–85 (enjoining the defendants
from releasing water in order to make repairs to their pond, since those repairs could have been made at
a different time at which the release of water would not divert a significant source of the plaintiff’s
spring, used to provide the city of Springfield with water).
139 Sycamore Coal Co. v. Stanley, 166 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Ky. 1942) (emphasis added); see also
Ryan v. Quinlan, 124 P. 512, 516 (Mont. 1912) (explaining that a landowner can use water as he sees fit
but “the use must be without malice or negligence”).
140 Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164, 169, 175–76 (1882).
141 Id. at 173.
142 De Bok v. Doak, 176 N.W. 631, 634 (Iowa 1920) (citations omitted).
143 Id.
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plaintiff is . . . urging his needs in supplying human beings with water.”144
“The relative need and use” of the water, rather than the defendant’s intent,
was spite’s test.145
The attitude evinced by prior rulings led the Iowa court to question the
soundness of the literal reading of the Acton Rule’s spite exception.146
Elsewhere, that prevailing attitude led courts to question the soundness of
the Acton Rule itself. In contrast to its notional basis, in practice the spite
exception was a means of introducing into water allocation decisions a
comparison of the social value of competing water uses. But if a balancing
test was necessary in such decisions, why adhere to a rule granting the
owner absolute freedom—the Acton Rule—and then subject it to an
exception only furtively introducing such balancing?
Unsurprisingly, for many, the spite qualification of the absolute
ownership theory could not allay criticisms of the Acton Rule.147 Back in
1862, the New Hampshire court had found the spite exception insufficient
to remedy the Acton Rule’s injustice—a ban on spite wells, it reasoned,
“seems anomalous under the theory [courts] adopt [i.e., the Acton Rule].”148
The New Hampshire court thus spurned the Acton Rule altogether. It
instituted a reasonable use standard: an owner did not have the absolute
right to use percolating waters, only the right to use them in a reasonable
manner, accounting for neighbors’ interests.149 At the time, as explained
above, other courts shared the New Hampshire court’s concerns regarding
the Acton Rule’s fairness, but they were reluctant to forthrightly adopt this
alternative theory, judging themselves unqualified to balance different
owners’ interests due to the limited understanding of percolating waters’
ways.150
But science was not standing still. By the turn of the century the
knowledge about natural forces, such as water, had progressed

144

Id.
Id.
146 Id. at 633–34 (first citing Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904);
then citing Springfield Waterworks Co. v. Jenkins, 62 Mo. App. 74 (1895); then citing Pence v. Carney,
52 S.E. 702 (W. Va. 1905); then citing Barclay v. Abraham, 96 N.W. 1080 (Iowa 1903); and then citing
Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907 (Minn. 1903)).
147 Summers, supra note 108, at 175.
148 Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 575 (1862).
149 Id. at 577.
150 See supra notes 111–12. The New Hampshire court was unimpressed by “the alleged difficulty
of determining the direction and extent of percolation and drainage.” Bassett, 43 N.H. at 574. Instead, it
thought “[i]n a large number of cases no such difficulty exists, and the remainder may be provided for
consistently, and in accordance with settled legal principles.” Id.
145
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dramatically.151 The judicial refusal to regulate percolating waters’ use was
no longer easily justifiable by lack of expertise. Judges could now be
furnished with data regarding the location and amount of percolating
waters as necessary for fairly allocating those waters.152 Moreover, the
absence of legal regulation was threatening social welfare, since the
nation’s expanding population and incessant development generated acute
water shortages, particularly in the arid west.153 Consequently, in state court
after state court, the Acton Rule gave way to the New Hampshire
reasonable use rule,154 which eventually became the majority rule—
christened the American Rule.155
With the Acton Rule’s demise, the spite exception’s logic won the
day. The exception itself, though, inevitably became superfluous. The
exception, as seen, was premised not on the advisability of a mental state
test, but on the desirability of the balancing of utilities. Once the rule for
allocating water rights itself became reasonable use—i.e., the balancing of
all owners’ interests—the need for a balancing-based exception to the rule
ended. Accordingly, references to a spite exception disappeared from
American water law by the twentieth century’s second quarter. Although
officials were complaining that owners were drilling spite wells to harm

151 State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Wis. 1974) (“Even in 1903 . . . ,
the awe of mysterious, unknowable forces beneath the earth was fast becoming an outmoded basis for a
rule of law.”); see also Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 768–69 (Cal. 1903) (describing the physical
condition of the state in explaining why the reasons for the Acton Rule no longer apply). Compare
CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION § 49, at 70–71 (Washington, D.C., W.H.
Lowdermilk & Co., 1894) (arguing earlier that the percolating water percolated through the ground in
unknown channels), with FARNHAM, supra note 108, at 2711 (noting the difficulty in discerning the
progress of underground water as the traditional explanation for the lack of regulation in the field, but
concluding, in 1904, that “[t]here is no reason why the use of such water should not be brought within
definite rules the same as any other class of property”). For an example of a contemporary court relying
on expert opinions to settle a dispute over percolating water, see Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline,
20 So. 780, 785 (Fla. 1896).
152 Meeker v. City of East Orange, 74 A. 379, 384 (N.J. 1909) (arguing that courts justify the Acton
Rule citing a difficulty to ascertain facts respecting underground water, but this difficulty is readily
solved through expert evidence).
153 See Katz, 74 P. at 768–69.
154 E.g., id. at 773; Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917); Schenk v. City of Ann
Arbor, 163 N.W. 109, 114 (Mich. 1917); Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks Power & Light Co.,
117 N.W. 435, 441 (Minn. 1908); Meeker, 74 A. at 385; Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v.
Rickert, 89 S.W.2d 889, 896–97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935); Patrick v. Smith, 134 P. 1076, 1079 (Wash.
1913); see also WIEL, supra note 93, at § 1041, at 973 (“There is a steady trend of decision in America
away from the English rule . . . .”). The reasonable use test varied between states. Mostly, it meant a
prohibition on waste. Some used a correlative rights test, which one author argued was meaningfully
different. Marion Rice Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1948).
155 Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel Co., 271 F. 157, 162–63 (8th Cir.
1921) (“The rule . . . may be said to be the American . . . rule.”); Horne v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 202 P.
815, 820 (Utah 1921) (“[W]hat is now known as the ‘American doctrine’ [is] the doctrine of
‘reasonable use.’”).
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neighbors as late as in 2011,156 courts no longer even mention spite as
relevant to water disputes.
This inaction is hardly surprising, as the presence of actual spite was
never a real concern of courts; instead, courts were troubled by the
presence of a water law rule thwarting the appraisal of water uses’
usefulness. By and large, that rule is no longer present in America. Thus
from the late 1920s until this Article was written, spite, as a potential
consideration in percolating waters disputes, was alluded to by only two
state courts157—both members of the tiny minority of states still following
the Acton Rule.158 Interestingly, in neither of these cases is spite seriously
analyzed. Having rejected the American Rule’s balancing of utilities test,
these state courts are apparently disinclined to engage in spite analysis,
seeing that in water law, such analysis has always entailed not intent tests,
but the balancing of utilities.
Spite, as a meaningful legal category, enjoyed a brief heyday in water
law. Unheard of before, and dormant thereafter, it was discussed in a flurry
of decisions during the roughly three decades surrounding the twentieth
century’s dawn. The rise and fall of the prohibition on spite wells shadows
the rise and fall of the Acton Rule—the rule allowing owners free license to
draw water regardless of effects on neighbors. Courts that were unhappy
with that rule, but hesitant to formally opt for another due to the time’s
scientific limitations, turned to a spite exception: an exception grounded in
supposedly discernable intent, but in fact used to introduce the balancing of
interests. Once scientific advances enabled courts to proceed to formally
adopt a balancing rule, the need for this exception vanished. Importantly,
throughout, the law of spite in the subfield of water law never concerned
itself with mental states. This detachment set the pattern for spite’s function
in other property subfields, as shall be seen next.

156 VT. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., A REVIEW OF THE “OVERSHADOWING” OF WATER SUPPLY–
WASTEWATER SYSTEM ISOLATION DISTANCES 19, 23 (2010), http://drinkingwater.vt.gov/rotac/pdf/
2011.01.15.tacovershadowingrep.pdf [http://perma.cc/R33U-R5BN]; Me. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., Position Paper: Maine Subsurface Wastewater Disposal Rules 10-144 CMR 241 (Jan. 18, 2011),
http://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/environmental-health/plumb/documents/rules/swd-rules-positionpaper.doc [https://perma.cc/DNV8-BSGH].
157 See Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 152 n.4 (Me. 1999); Fain v. Great Spring Waters of Am.,
Inc., 973 S.W.2d 327, 328–29 (Tex. App. 1998).
158 Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 274 (2013)
(“[The absolute dominion rule] perhaps survives to any real degree only in Indiana, Maine, and
Texas.”). The Texas court has recently adopted the extreme position that the owner’s right to
percolating waters is a property right, whose regulation may amount to an unconstitutional taking.
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 833 (Tex. 2012).

383

SHOKED (DO NOT DELETE)

2/17/2016 12:24 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

B. Spite in Land Use Law
Water law’s restriction on spite wells was the first instance where
American courts relied on spite to determine the rights of bickering
neighbors, but the most prominent and commented upon instance is land
use law’s restriction on malicious structures.159 Indeed, the example
launching this Article broached spite in land use law. Unlike in water law,
in land use the spite prohibition is still invoked today. Nonetheless, as this
Section will show, spite in land use law followed the same trajectory as its
counterpart in water law. Here too, the exception first emerged when the
law afforded the owner absolute freedom of action. It permitted courts to
moderate this freedom to account for public policy considerations, while
still nominally adhering to the absolute freedom rule whose rationale
persisted. As was the case in water law, once conditions changed in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries unsettling this rationale, the
absolute freedom rule was displaced; and thus, the spite exception that had
before tempered owners’ absolute freedom lost its role and ceased to
evolve. In fact, spite’s story in land use exemplifies even more vividly than
its water law peer this Part’s thesis that spite doctrine did not deal with
subjective intent, but rather introduced objective restraints when the law
formally afforded the owner absolute freedom. For in land use, spite went
through a prehistory, during which courts explicitly denied that spite could
carry legal weight—up until the moment when an absolute owner freedom
rule was set in place.
Disputes over structures owners build on their lands are some of the
most common conflicts between neighbors. In the typical case, an owner
builds a structure on her land that, since it is visible from her neighbor’s
land, affects the latter’s views: limiting exposure to sun and vistas, or
adding aesthetically unpleasing sights. Such disputes multiply as the
environment grows crowded and as construction technologies improve.
Hence, disputes over structures became a staple of American property law
in the teeming nineteenth century.
At first, when courts were faced with such disputes, they adopted an
approach starkly different from the Acton Rule, the absolute owner
privilege rule applied to water. The English common law settled land use
disputes through the doctrine of “ancient lights.”160 A doctrine whose
origins were murkier than often assumed, it held that an owner had the

159 E.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 785 (8th ed. 2014); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
PROPERTY 139 (4th ed. 2014).
160 See Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6, 26
(1910).
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right to the continued flow of light and air over neighboring land if he had
been enjoying such exposure in the past.161 Originally this meant enjoyment
since time immemorial162 (or from the time of Richard I, whichever came
last),163 but later courts settled on the somewhat less prolonged period of
twenty years.164 Thusly formulated, the rule dictated that if an owner
created an opening for a window twenty or more years ago, her neighbor
could not block that window’s views: through the passage of time, the
owner had gained an easement for the passage of light and air over the
neighbor’s land.165 If, on the other hand, windows were in existence for
161 It was often claimed that the doctrine of “ancient lights” was formally adopted by the King’s
Bench in the case of Darwin v. Upton, (1786) 85 Eng. Rep. 922, 927–28; 2 Wms. Saund. 172, 174
n.(2), though beforehand it might have been a London custom. E.g., Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318
(N.Y. 1838) (“[T]he doctrine [of ancient lights] was not sanctioned . . . until 1786, when the case o [sic]
Darwin v. Upton was decided by the K[ing’s] B[ench].”); EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 492 (Philadelphia, George W. Childs 1863) (“And it
is said that, as a rule of law, [the right to light resulting from long enjoyment] never became settled in
Westminster Hall until 1786 . . . .”). Presumably that late eighteenth-century decision reversed a
centuries-old decision, Bury v. Pope, (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 375; Cro. Eliz. 118, which had rejected the
doctrine. But the decision in Darwin v. Upton is nowhere to be found, and references to it have always
cited a later case, Yard v. Ford, (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 922; 2 Wms. Saund. 172, which mentioned and
summarized the ruling while addressing a different doctrinal issue. Moreover, it is unclear whether the
case supposedly reversed by Darwin v. Upton actually rejected the doctrine of ancient lights. Bury v.
Pope does state that “lights [that] have continued by the space of thirty or forty years” can be blocked
by a neighbor. (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 375, 375; Cro. Eliz. 118, 118. This result and reasoning did not
necessarily foreclose on the possibility that lights that had continued for a period of time longer than
thirty or forty years—namely, since time immemorial—could not be blocked. And indeed, the same
case was also reported in another version, under the title Bowry v. Pope, (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 155;
1 Leo. 168, where the court explicitly stated that lights enjoyed through “an antient [sic] window time
out of memory” could not be impaired. id. at 155; 1 Leo. 168. In this version of the case, the plaintiff’s
claim was still denied, but not because owners had no right for the maintenance of ancient lights, but
rather since that plaintiff’s window dated solely to the time of Queen Mary, still very much in memory
during the reign of Queen Elizabeth (her successor) when the Bowry suit reached the court. I am
particularly grateful to Peter Nascenzi, of the Northwestern University Law Review, for his help in
conducting research for this note.
162 Early cases apparently interpreted Bury v. Pope, discussed supra in note 161, as implying that
ancient lights will be protected, if they have been enjoyed since “time out of mind.” See, e.g., Rosewell
v. Prior (1696) 91 Eng. Rep. 396, 397; 2 Salkeld 459, 460 (holding that ancient lights “imports usage
time out of mind”); Villers v. Ball (1689) 89 Eng. Rep. 412, 412 n.(a); 1 Show. K.B. 7, 7 n.(a); Newal
v. Barnard (1612) 80 Eng. Rep. 812, 812–13; 1 Bulstrode 116, 116–17; Bland v. Moseley (1587)
77 Eng. Rep. 817, 817 n.(B); 9 Co. Rep. 58a, 58a n.(B).
163 Isaac F. Redfield, Recent English Decisions Upon Leading Questions, 11 AM. L. REG. 522, 523
(1863).
164 See Cross v. Lewis (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 538, 538; 2 B. & C. 686, 686–87; Daniel v. North
(1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 1047, 1047–48; 11 East. 372, 372–73; Yard v. Ford (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 922,
932–33 n.(2)(d); 2 Wms. Saund. 172, 175 n.(2)(d). Courts were influenced by an Act of Parliament
from 1623 setting the prescription period at twenty years. See Gwathney v. Stump, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.)
308, 313 (1814) (describing the influence of acts of Parliament on the shortening of the time required
for finding a prescriptive easement); Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 306 (1869) (same).
165 The English courts struggled to define the legal basis for the doctrine. E.g., Blanchard v.
Bridges (1835) 111 Eng. Rep. 753, 759–61; 4 Ad. & E. 176, 190–95. The acquisition of the easement
for light and air through the ancient lights doctrine could not coherently be attributed to traditional
prescription principles, since by continuously enjoying access to light and air over her neighbor’s land
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only less than twenty years, the neighbor was free to construct any
structure, regardless of its effects on the owner’s access to light and air.
The ancient lights doctrine thus balanced neighbors’ competing interests in
land use through a bright-line timing test.
Because this test was formally adopted in England only after the
colonies had broken away, American courts later in the nineteenth century
would deny that it ever held sway here.166 But the historical record shows
that when relevant disputes initially occurred in America in the 1830s and
1840s, all courts considering the issue applied the ancient lights doctrine,167
or at least assumed its authority.168
Against this doctrinal background, the problem of spite structures—
more specifically, spite fences—first arose. Under the ancient lights
doctrine, an owner was free to erect any structure, regardless of its effect on
neighboring windows, for the first two decades following the windows’
opening. Was this also true if the structure erected during those early years
was motived by spite? In 1836, a New York court affirmed that it was. The
court declared in Mahan v. Brown169 that the owner was free to construct a
spite fence blocking a neighbor’s views as long as it was built within the

the owner was not engaged in an activity adverse to the rights of that neighbor, as is required for
acquiring rights through adverse possession or prescriptive easement theories. The ancient lights rule’s
theory was thus the lost grant—the easement’s long use was evidence of an earlier grant of said
easement—which has since been lost or forgotten. See Bedle v. Beard (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1288, 1289;
12 Co. Rep 4, 5 (“God forbid that ancient grants and acts should be drawn into question, although they
cannot be shewn . . . .”); Note, Doctrine of Lost Grant, 16 HARV. L. REV 438, 438 (1903) (“At first,
immemorial use was held to be necessary . . . . This unsatisfactory rule was later modified by the
doctrine of lost grant.” (citation omitted)). A separate theory allowed for the recognition of a similar
right to continued enjoyment of exposure to light and air even if that enjoyment did not date to ancient
times. In the absence of prescription, a landowner’s right to light and air could still be protected if both
neighboring lands—the land enjoying the light and air and the adjacent land whose owner was now
blocking said light and air—were originally owned by the same person. Palmer v. Fletcher (1662)
83 Eng. Rep. 329, 329; 1 Lev. 122, 122; WASHBURN, supra note 161, at 493–97. This doctrine is
known today as easement implied by prior use. E.g., Granite Props. Ltd. P’ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d
1230, 1236 (Ill. 1987). This doctrine of implied easements—which is no longer applied by American
courts to easements for light and air—is grounded in the presumption that when the owner of both lots
originally conveyed one of them, the intent was to convey or preserve an easement allowing one lot to
continue enjoying rights over the other.
166 E.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 532–33 (1855).
167 Manier v. Myers, 43 Ky. (4 B. Mon.) 514, 520 (1844); Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng) 157,
160 (1815); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57, 64 (Ch. 1838) (explicitly rejecting the claim that
conditions in the state differ from those in England so as to justify a refusal to apply the doctrine);
McCready v. Thomson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1838) (same); Shreve v. Voorhees, 3 N.J. Eq. 25, 32–33
(Ch. 1834).
168 Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63, 66 (1846); State v. Mayor & Aldermen of Mobile, 5 Port. 279, 302
(Ala. 1837); Ingraham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn. 584, 597–98 (1818); McDonogh v. Calloway, 7 Rob.
442, 444 (La. 1844); Campbell v. Smith, 8 N.J.L. 140, 148 (1825); Cooper v. Smith, 9 Serg. & Rawle
26, 33 (Pa. 1822); Lining v. Geddes, 6 S.C. Eq. (1 McCord Eq.) 304, 309 (1826).
169 13 Wend. 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
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ancient lights’ allowable period of time.170 Indeed, it was that doctrine’s
presence that persuaded the court to refrain from banning the spiteful
fence.171 Since the owner would lose his right to block the neighbor’s views
if he failed to build within twenty years, fairness required that he enjoy full
liberty until that period had passed.172
This early move lends support to this Part’s argument. The New York
court refused to assign legal significance to spite when there was no rule
affording owners absolute freedom; that is, when no attenuating of a
privilege rule was necessary. Through its timing test the ancient lights
doctrine already balanced neighboring owners’ interests, and hence courts
perceived no need to introduce a spite exception to perform that same
function. The next stage in land use law’s development validates again that
this—not the policing of mental states—has indeed been spite’s consistent
function in American law. For after courts switched the governing rule in
land use, turning a balancing rule into an owner’s absolute freedom rule,
the prohibition on spiteful fences was reconsidered.173
In New York, the switch of general rules in land use came briskly.
Three years after the Mahan decision, New York courts rejected the ancient
lights doctrine, freeing owners to erect structures at any time no matter the
effect on neighbors’ longstanding exposure to light.174 The ancient lights
doctrine’s reign in New York was particularly brief, but throughout the
country, courts dismissed that English (and formerly American) doctrine in
the 1850s and 1860s.175 The rejection was ascribed to the drastically
differing physical conditions prevalent in England—the doctrine’s

170
171

Id. at 263.
H.H. Rumble, Limitations on the Use of Property by Its Owner, 5 VA. L. REV. 297, 307–08

(1918).
172

Mahan, 13 Wend. at 263.
See Horan v. Byrnes, 54 A. 945, 947 (N.H. 1903) (explaining that Mahan’s denial of a spite
prohibition became irrelevant once the view of land use law it stood upon was abandoned).
174 Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 317–19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). The court later stressed that the
easement for light and air could similarly not be acquired through the doctrine of easement implied
from prior use (i.e., even in cases where both lands were originally held by a common owner). Myers v.
Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537, 545–46 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1851).
175 See, e.g., Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500, 501–02 (1861); Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 223 (1854);
Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 440–41, 443–44 (1847); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1, 21–23 (1858)
(rejecting the ancient lights doctrine, but refusing to opine on the possibility that the easement for light
and air could be acquired as an easement implied from prior use); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L.
(5 Rich.) 311, 316, 319–23 (1852) (same); King v. Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559, 559 (Ch. 1851); Klein v.
Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232, 242 (Supp. 1860); Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 307 (1869). The first
to appear hostile to the doctrine was the Massachusetts court. In dictum in a percolating water case, it
declared: “[T]he proprietor . . . may consult his own convenience in his operations above or below the
surface of his ground. He may obstruct the light and air above, and cut off the springs of water below
the surface.” Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117, 123 (1836).
173
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birthplace—and the New World.176 In a new land where cities were
frenetically growing, the ancient lights doctrine carried worrisome
antidevelopmental consequences.177 First, and most troubling, it
aggressively limited construction. It prioritized pleasing views, which were
now an indulgence, at the expense of new structures, which were a
necessity.178 Second, it compelled empty lots’ owners to build on them
immediately or risk losing the right to build, thereby hampering orderly
development.179 For some courts, these reasons merely warranted limiting
the doctrine’s reach in urban centers.180 But most courts forwent
gradualism: they found the prodevelopment rationale so compelling that
they renounced the ancient lights doctrine altogether, inaccurately denying
ever recognizing it.181 The move formed part of the marked prodevelopment
slant of American land law of the mid-nineteenth century. As prominent
historians have noted in other contexts, to enable dynamic economic
growth, the American law of the time broke with static property precepts
that were characteristic of English law.182
As the second half of the nineteenth century progressed, little doubt
remained that the ancient lights doctrine was wholeheartedly repudiated.

176 The technical rationale for the rejection was that, in its contemporary incarnation, the English
doctrine, awarding the right after twenty years of continued enjoyment, was inspired by a statute of
limitations not adopted in the colonies or states. Hence American courts argued that that doctrine did
not form part of the common law applicable here. Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 306 (1869).
Furthermore, and in the absence of statutory support, American courts stressed that the normal method
for prescription’s operation was irrelevant to light and air as explained supra in note 165. A prescriptive
right to continue an activity is gained after the landowner refrains from taking legal action to stop said
activity for the statutory period of time. But the owner through whose land another receives light and air
never had a legal right to stop the other from consuming the light and air. Cunningham, 3 W. Va. at
306; King, 8 N.J. Eq. at 559. In most states the denial of the English statute of limitations thus led to the
flat out rejection of the ancient lights doctrine. But for the Illinois court it was grounds for reverting to
the original ancient lights doctrine. In Illinois, a right to continued access to light and air could only be
acquired if the plaintiff had been enjoying it since time out of mind. Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217, 221–
22 (1854).
177 Parker, 19 Wend. at 318 (“[T]he modern English doctrine on the subject of lights . . . may do
well enough in England . . . . But it cannot be applied in the growing cities and villages of this country,
without working the most mischievous consequences.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted));
WASHBURN, supra note 161, at 497–98. The South Carolina court listed as factors distinguishing
America from England and necessitating the abandonment of the doctrine not only the wider spaces and
more rapid development found here, but also “the less jealous habits of our people.” Napier, 39 S.C.L.
at 322–23.
178 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1894).
179 See Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts 327, 331 (Pa. 1834).
180 E.g., Fifty Assocs. v. Tudor, 72 Mass. (6 Gray), 255, 259–60 (1856); see also 3 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *448 (acknowledging the application of the ancient lights doctrine
in the United States, but presuming that it does not apply to narrow urban lots).
181 E.g., Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368, 371 (1859); Parker, 19 Wend. at 316–18.
182 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 31–54
(1977).
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Unlike in England, in America an owner was free to build as she pleased.183
The absolute privilege rule for land use was of the same cast as the
contemporaneous absolute privilege rule for percolating waters. And as
was the case with the Acton Rule, in due course, the absolute privilege rule
for structures would strike courts and commentators as too strict, and
exceptions—particularly, a spite exception—would emerge.
The push to authorize courts to regulate owners’ land uses through
balancing tests surfaced gradually as ideas about property evolved. A full
account of the reinvention of property in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries extends beyond this Article’s scope, and I have
elaborated on the topic elsewhere.184 A brief summary should suffice. As
noted above, the ancient lights doctrine was unequivocally rejected during
the middle decades of the nineteenth century—an era of fledgling
economic development with a legal regime facilitating growth.185 But by
century’s end, physical and economic conditions were changing drastically.
The western frontier had closed,186 and the nation was rapidly urbanizing.
In accordance, the impulse to facilitate development at all costs was easing.
Furthermore, conflicts between owners, now living in much closer vicinity
to each other than ever before, were intensifying. In the newly cramped
settings of the built environment of the era, an owner needed a greater
degree of protection against neighboring development that might threaten
her well-being—even at the inevitable cost of a decrease in her own legal
freedom to develop her land.
This demand for protection translated into legal reforms. Water law,
as seen earlier, was transformed;187 elsewhere, an aggressive nuisance
jurisprudence developed to limit certain owner activities;188 new statutes
barred other land uses;189 and tenement acts, launched by New York in
183 See Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698, 702 (Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that a reason for the
ancient lights’ rejection in the middle of the nineteenth century was that “a landowner’s rights to use his
land were virtually unlimited; it was thought that he owned to the center of the earth and up to the
heavens”).
184 See Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the
Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2011).
185 See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
186 On the significance of the disappearance of the “unsettled” West, see FREDERICK JACKSON
TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Penguin Books 2008) (1893).
187 See supra Section II.A.
188 E.g., McMorran v. Fitzgerald, 64 N.W. 569, 569–70 (Mich. 1895) (enjoining the operation of a
machine and blacksmith shop in an area otherwise devoted to residences). See generally Robert G.
Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1101 (1986) (exploring the history of American nuisance law, which limits owners’ certain uses
of land).
189 See, e.g., In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327, 328–29 (Cal. 1886) (approving statute limiting laundries);
Cronin v. People, 82 N.Y. 318, 322–23 (1880) (approving statute limiting slaughter houses).
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1867, set minimum standards for rental units.190 As part of this mounting
wave of land use regulation, the prohibition on spite fences, rejected
decades earlier in the Mahan decision discussed above, was reappraised.
The tale of the case reevaluating the prohibition is emblematic of the
evolving conditions and legal demands of the American-built environment
of the late nineteenth century. In the already mentioned 1888 case of Burke
v. Smith, the Michigan court was faced with a neighbors’ dispute from
Kalamazoo.191 Originally a village, Kalamazoo graduated into cityhood less
than five years before the dispute.192 The dispute arose when one owner,
Burke, took advantage of the locale’s swift development by subdividing his
lot into rental units.193 Unpleased with the project, a neighbor named Smith
erected a fence blocking light from reaching one of the units.194 The court
enjoined this fence, holding that the rule affording Smith the right to build
as he pleases—i.e., the denial of the ancient lights doctrine—must admit an
exception for structures motivated by spite, such as Smith’s fence.195
The treatment of that Kalamazoo spite fence set the tone for fences
elsewhere. In the succeeding years, many courts followed Burke,196 and
concurrently, the 1880s and the ensuing decades witnessed a spate of
statutes specifically barring spite fences.197 By and large, the earlier New
York decision of Mahan was no longer the law of the land.198 Like the
digging of spite wells discussed earlier, the erection of spite fences ceased
to count among an owner’s prerogatives.
On its face, the prohibition on spite fences—whether originating in
judicial or legislative act—trafficked in mental states. As explained in
Burke, an owner was proscribed from acting for “a wicked purpose . . . to
gratify his spite and malice towards his neighbor.”199 Yet almost
immediately after spite’s introduction, the test changed. Two years after
Burke, the Michigan court transformed the question, “Was the fence
190 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION
25–39 (1968).
191 37 N.W. 838, 838 (Mich. 1888).
192 An Act to Re-incorporate the Village of Kalamazoo, and to Repeal All Inconsistent Acts and
Parts of Acts, No. 337, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 667 (incorporating the village of Kalamazoo as the city of
Kalamazoo).
193 Burke, 37 N.W. at 838.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 839–40.
196 POWELL, supra note 34, at § 62.05, at 62-45 n.4 (explaining that the decision represented a
turning point for many other states).
197 See infra notes 210–15.
198 In New York, a court found the “old” Mahan precedent irrelevant since the legislature adopted a
spite fence statute. Saperstein v. Berman, 195 N.Y.S. 1, 2 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
199 37 N.W. at 842.
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builder’s purpose wicked?” into the question, “Does the fence serve a
‘useful or needful purpose?’”200
When determining whether a fence was spiteful, courts in Michigan
and the other states asked whether it served a useful purpose. The precise
role assigned to this question was not always clear. The question could
sometimes be read as the evidentiary tool through which spite’s presence
was discerned.201 More often, it was posed as the substantive test for spite: a
spiteful fence was a fence lacking a useful purpose.202 Either way, this, and
not the question respecting the builder’s actual mental state, was the
inquiry courts preferred to contemplate when debating the existence of
spite. Such invocation of a usefulness standard inexorably shifted spite
law’s focus away from its alleged subjective interest.203
One court appears to have sensed this shift and could not square it
with the reasoning leading to the spite prohibition.204 The Alabama court
thus insisted that a plaintiff actually prove the defendant’s malicious intent
to injure him.205 The plaintiff in that case provided evidence that the fence
was useless, but the court would not equate uselessness with malice, or
infer the latter from the former.206 Yet the Alabama court was an outlier.
Elsewhere, courts could readily announce: “Even though it should be held
that defendants did not intend to injure plaintiff’s business, yet, since their
acts brought about such a result, with no profits or benefits to themselves,
the legal effect of their action is the same as if they had purposely intended
the result.”207 Accordingly, it became clear that a spiteful fence could be
found in actual spite’s absence,208 and that a fence motivated by actual spite
could be deemed nonspiteful.209

200

Flaherty v. Moran, 45 N.W. 381, 381 (Mich. 1890).
E.g., Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 P. 1158, 1159 (Okla. 1916).
202 E.g., Parker v. Harvey, 164 So. 507, 512 (La. Ct. App. 1935); Metz v. Tierney, 83 P. 788, 788
(N.M. 1906); Bush v. Mockett, 145 N.W. 1001, 1002 (Neb. 1914); Barger v. Barringer, 66 S.E. 439,
442 (N.C. 1909); Racich v. Mastrovich, 273 N.W. 660, 663 (S.D. 1937).
203 Perhaps for this reason, one early twentieth-century writer actually referred to the early spite
fence cases as “apply[ing] the doctrine of reasonable use in cases involving unnecessary obstruction of
light and air.” Rumble, supra note 171, at 308. The author concludes that the cases should be read as
instituting a principle that “[a] use which is inspired by malice and which is injurious to others than the
owner, in order to be lawful, must be reasonable.” Id. at 314 (emphasis removed).
204 Norton v. Randolph, 58 So. 283, 285 (Ala. 1912).
205 Id. at 286.
206 Id.
207 Parker, 164 So. at 512.
208 E.g., id.
209 Stroup v. Rauschelbach, 261 S.W. 346, 347 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924); Green v. Schick, 153 P.2d
821, 822 (Okla. 1944).
201
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Courts thus incorporated a usefulness requirement into precedents
prohibiting spite fences, lessening their subjective slant. Where the
prohibition was instituted through statute, there was much less need for
such judicial moves as, in the first place, most legislatures set objective
standards for their statutes’ application. Some statutes did not even require
spite when enjoining “spite” fences. The 1885 California law required an
adjoining landowner’s consent for the construction of any fence exceeding
ten feet in height.210 New York’s 1922 law declared all such fences
blocking a neighbor’s light and air nuisances.211 Other statutes that did
require spite supplemented the spite requirement with other, objective
prerequisites. The fence not only had to be spitefully motivated, but it also
had to exceed a certain height (generally, six feet), and most prominently,
be “unnecessary.”212 In other words, under the statutes, not all spite fences
were spite fences for legal purposes: a low fence could never be actionable,
and a tall fence could not be barred if it were in some way necessary.
Courts regarded the unnecessariness requirement as vital. When the
Massachusetts spite fence statute’s constitutionality was challenged, Justice
Holmes implied that it would not have been upheld had its ambit not been
qualified through the unnecessariness requirement: “If the height above six
feet is really necessary for any reason, there [must be] no liability,
whatever the motives of the owner in erecting it.”213 Likewise, in
Washington and Connecticut, two of only three states whose statutes
merely required malicious intent to render a fence actionable,214 courts

210

Act of Mar. 9, 1885, ch. 39, 1885 Cal. Stat. 45.
Act of Mar. 30, 1922, ch. 374, 1922 N.Y. Laws 795 (applicable to fences over ten feet).
212 Act of May 28, 1913, ch. 197, 1913 Cal. Stat. 342 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 841.4 (Deering 2014)) (ten feet) (adopting a second spite fence law after the scope of the first one was
drastically narrowed by the court in Granite & Marble v. Knickerbocker, 37 P. 192 (Cal. 1894)); Act of
Mar. 7, 1893, ch. 188, 1893 Me. Laws 205 (codified as amended at ME STAT. tit. 17, § 2801 (2014))
(eight feet; amended to six feet by Act of Mar. 26, 1903, ch. 153, 1903 Me. Laws 119); Act of June 2,
1887, ch. 348, 1887 Mass. Acts 971 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 49, § 21 (2014))
(six feet); Act of Oct. 25, 1887, ch. 91, 1887 N.H. Laws 469 (codified as amended at N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 476:1 (2014)) (five feet); Act of June 22, 1917, ch. 213, 1917 Pa. Laws 621 (codified as
amended at 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 15171 (West 2014)) (four feet); Act of May 4, 1909, ch.
416, 1909 R.I. Pub. Laws 148 (codified as amended at 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-10-20 (2014)) (six feet);
Act of Nov. 19, 1886, ch. 84, 1887 Vt. Acts & Resolves 59 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 3817 (2014)) (six feet; amended to no height restriction by Act of Dec. 11, 1912, ch. 154, 1913
Vt. Acts & Resolves 185); Act of Apr. 20, 1903, ch. 81, Wis. Sess. Laws 121 (repealed by Act of Apr.
24, 1974, ch. 189, § 11, 1974 Wis. Sess. Laws 595) (six feet) (overruling Metzger v. Hochrein, 83 N.W.
308 (Wis. 1900), where the court refused to adopt the spite fence doctrine).
213 Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889).
214 The third state was Minnesota. See Act of Apr. 24, 1907, ch. 387, 1907 Minn. Laws 545
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 561.02 (2014)). However, it was not until 2009 that a nuisance
case was decided in reference to the statute. See Gelao v. Coss, No. A08-1725, 2009 WL 2745833, at
*7–8 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009).
211
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added the requirement that the fence be unnecessary.215 The Connecticut
court explained that although the statute solely required malicious intent,
“intention relates to the thing done and its purpose and effect, and does not
depend on the existence or nonexistence of personal spite or ill will.”216
Accordingly, the court concluded that the degree to which the defendant in
the case at bar shared his spouse’s enmity towards the plaintiff was of
limited importance to a spite finding.217 The determinative question was
whether the fence he had built was of any use.218
In a process mirroring the one Section II.A detected in water law, the
adjective spiteful in land use law was reimagined as meaning useless or
unnecessary. A term relating to subjective personal intent was replaced
with one reflecting objective social worth.219 This development did not
render the doctrine less innovative for its time; if anything, it made spite
more revolutionary. Spite doctrine measured a structure’s social value
before condoning an owner’s decision to build. It thence turned into a tool
for regulating land uses—into one of the first legal instruments
empowering public decisionmakers to design the physical environment in a
socially beneficial manner. The equation of spitefulness with uselessness
did so almost explicitly: the criterion for spite was that a fence generate
harm to one piece of land without generating a benefit to another.220 As
courts stated, this was at heart a reasonableness, or proportionality, test.221
One court clarified that the “evil” spite fence laws were intended to remedy
was not
the bickerings, spite, and hatred arising from neighborhood quarrels. It is
difficult for any legislation to remedy such evil. Plainly, the real evil consists
in the occasional subjection of a landowner to the impairment of the value of
his land by the erection of a structure which substantially serves . . . no
purpose . . . .222

Similarly, for Justice Holmes the spite fence prohibition was a
constitutional exercise of the police power since “it simply restrains a
noxious use of the owner’s premises”223 and “limit[s] the use of property in
215

Whitlock v. Uhle, 53 A. 891, 892 (Conn. 1903); Karasek v. Peier, 61 P. 33, 36 (Wash. 1900).
Whitlock, 53 A. at 892.
217 Id. at 893.
218 Id. at 892.
219 The modern doctrine of spite was said to be “based on the rule of reason.” Rumble, supra note
171, at 315.
220 Whitlock, 53 A. at 892.
221 E.g., Bush v. Mockett, 145 N.W. 1001, 1002 (Neb. 1914); Horan v. Byrnes, 54 A. 945, 948–49
(N.H. 1903); Karasek v. Peier, 61 P. 33, 36 (Wash. 1900).
222 Whitlock, 53 A. at 892.
223 Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390, 392 (Mass. 1889).
216

393

SHOKED (DO NOT DELETE)

2/17/2016 12:24 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

ways which greatly diminish its value.”224 Spite law did not strive to
proliferate common decency values; it endeavored to stimulate property
values.
As in water law, the prohibition on spite in land use burgeoned from a
realization that unbridled owner freedom may no longer be easily justified,
and thus the value of the use an owner chooses for her property should
sometimes be assessed. Spite was therefore a step away from the existing
regime monopolizing power in the owner. But as was the case in water law,
it was merely a first step—a timid and cautious one. Needs and ideas had
changed, but not far enough to fully undermine the prodevelopment
policies that engendered the rejection of the ancient lights doctrine. The
prohibition on spite fences did not posit too great of a threat to these
values.225 It singled out the construction of fences—and only fences—for
special treatment. This feature encapsulated the prohibition’s special
appeal. For jurists commencing to register the risk of unchecked
development but still queasy about full-blown land use regulation, a
prohibition applicable to fences alone was a confined, and therefore
attractive, rule.226 It was a convenient way station along a still tentative
course away from the absolute owner freedom regime.
Especially in retrospect, this guarded prohibition materializes as
harbinger of broader rules yet to come for thorough collective design of the
built environment. For example, statutes regulating spite fences towering
beyond a fixed height served as precursors to modern regulations capping
all structures’ heights. Or consider the Pennsylvania spite fence statute,
which held sway only in “suburban” areas.227 Its mode of operation was that
of future zoning laws, which would divide space into districts and enforce
different regulations in each.
As in water law, the exception from the owner privilege rule carved
out for spitefully motivated acts in land use announced the upcoming
general shift from a regime premised on the owner’s right to act as she

224

Id. at 393.
For some courts this was cause enough to decline the prohibition on spite fences. Since an
owner would be allowed to construct any other structure causing the same effects, there was no reason
to block him from constructing a fence. See, e.g., Giller v. West, 69 N.E. 548, 549 (Ind. 1904); Saddler
v. Alexander, 56 S.W. 518, 519 (Ky. 1900); Bordeaux v. Greene, 56 P. 218, 219 (Mont. 1899); Letts v.
Kessler, 42 N.E. 765, 766 (Ohio 1896).
226 Thus, for example, some courts stubbornly questioned local governments’ power to refuse
building permits, State v. Tenant, 14 S.E. 387, 388 (N.C. 1892), to prohibit some businesses, City of St.
Louis v. Dorr, 46 S.W. 976, 977 (Mo. 1897) (en banc), or to zone, Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W.
513, 514–15 (Tex. 1921).
227 Act of June 22, 1917, ch. 213, 1917 Pa. Laws 621 (codified as amended at 53 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. § 15171 (West 2014)).
225
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pleases to one steeped in public regulation.228 The objective balancing
approach that spite applied to fences would shortly expand through varied
legal means to cover all land use decisions. As seen, courts and legislatures
rediscovered the spite prohibition in the late 1880s. Almost immediately
thereafter, in the final decade of the nineteenth century, legislatures began
adopting general height regulations (laws restricting the height of all
buildings in a city or part thereof).229 In the next decade, opening the
twentieth century, they enacted rules respecting buildings’ bulk (laws
establishing setbacks, minimum lot sizes, and lot coverage limitations).230
In the century’s second decade, zoning laws (laws limiting the size,
location, and use of buildings in a city or part thereof) were introduced and
rapidly spread.231 Within a very short span of time, the meaning of property
in American law had shifted. Property law was no longer first and foremost
dedicated to the owner’s freedom to set the agenda for her land’s use.
Rather, it was committed to orderly growth and to protecting owners from
rampant development.232 Owners were now subject to onerous restrictions
and conditions aimed at safeguarding public benefits whenever they sought
to construct a building on their lands. The logic animating the spite
exception was generalized. Universal laws now achieved directly the goals
of social balancing and regulated development that the spite exception
pursued indirectly.
Inevitably, though, the need for a spite exception to the rule
privileging owners’ right to build disappeared alongside that privilege

228 See ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 549
(4th ed. 2013) (noting “spite fence doctrine” was one of the “earliest [principles] to evolve” in
“American nuisance law”).
229 Massachusetts enacted height regulations for Boston in 1891–1892. The restriction was upheld
in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
230 E.g., Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120, 121, 125 (N.Y. 1925) (upholding the constitutionality
of Act of 1909, ch. 26, 1909 N.Y. Laws 15).
231 The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted by New York City in 1916. It divided
the city into use districts, area districts, and height districts. The state court approved the ordinance in
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams, 128 N.E. 209 (N.Y. 1920). A few years before, in 1909, Los Angeles
approved an ordinance establishing “industrial districts” and declaring the remainder of the city to be a
“residence district,” where certain occupations, including laundries, were prohibited. The court
approved in Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 P. 714 (Cal. 1911). In 1910, Los Angeles further excluded brick
factories from some of the industrial districts. The Supreme Court upheld the move. Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404, 413 (1915). By 1926, all but five of the states had adopted zoning
enabling acts, and 420 municipalities had zoning ordinances. Brief for National Conference on City
Planning et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926) (No. 31), reprinted in ALFRED BETTMAN, CITY AND REGIONAL PLANNING PAPERS 157–93
(Arthur C. Comey ed., 1946).
232 See Shoked, supra note 184, at 142–45.
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rule.233 The same occurred, as should be recalled, in water law. The law
moved away from using the owner’s freedom as the baseline and towards
defaulting to objective regulation of her activity’s social costs and benefits.
Once that transformation was complete, the spite prohibition, always
concerned with that same form of objective regulation rather than with
motive tests, ceased to develop and withered away.234 Spite fence statutes
remained on the books, and precedents invalidating spite fences stood
undisturbed, but courts were unwilling to broaden them beyond their
existing, and highly qualified, scope.235
Most prominently, when solicited to apply spite prohibitions—
particularly, though not only, those found in statutes236—courts from the
second quarter of the twentieth century onwards asserted that the only
structures that could ever be enjoined were fences, the subject matter of the
old cases and statutes.237 Hence, often spite law cases came to hinge on one
question: what structures counted as fences? The litigated issue was
whether the contested structure was close enough to the property line to
constitute a fence,238 and whether it was in the “character” of a fence. Thus,
dilapidated houses could not be enjoined as spiteful,239 but a sign could.240 A

233 Cf. Kelly, supra note 39, at 1661 (noting that once zoning laws separated residential from
commercial and industrial parcels, litigation over nuisances created to force the disturbed party to buy
out the disturbing parties subsided).
234 Sometimes the power to prohibit spite fences was inserted into a general authorization to
regulate the height of fences. E.g., Act of Mar. 12, 1909, ch. 31, ch. 6, § 23, 1909 Tex. Loc. & Spec.
Laws 227, 272 (incorporating in the special charter granted to the city of Fort Worth the “power to
regulate the height and character of fences on private property . . . , and to prohibit the erection or
maintenance of ‘spite fences’”).
235 E.g., Cohen v. Perrino, 50 A.2d 348, 350–51 (Pa. 1947).
236 Courts used spite fence statutes to actually limit the reach of the doctrine in other ways as well.
For example, one court refused to apply the judicial doctrine to instances excluded from the state’s
fence law, which only applied to fences of six feet or more. Musumeci v. Leonardo, 75 A.2d 175, 177–
78 (R.I. 1950).
237 Even in the three states whose spite fence laws explicitly state their application to all structures,
courts have been reluctant to deal with non-fences. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-480, 52-570 (2014);
MINN. STAT. § 561.02 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.40.030 (2014). Only in one case has a court
exhibited a willingness to do so. See Piotrowski v. Esparo, No. CV084008715, 2009 WL 962694, at
*1–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2009) (finding the moving of a hangar, which was useful in itself, to
abut neighboring land was spiteful). In all other cases the claim has been adamantly rejected. E.g.,
Gundstrom v. Zweifel, No. A08-2259, 2009 WL 2747249, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009)
(refusing to apply the statute to an unsightly mound of dirt). In Washington, the court held early on that
a literal interpretation of the statute, empowering courts to block all structures and not just fences,
would be unconstitutional. Karasek v. Peier, 61 P. 33, 36 (Wash. 1900). Hence the court later held that a
garage could not be covered. Jones v. Williams, 106 P. 166, 168–69 (Wash. 1910).
238 See, e.g., Deraismes v. Ferguson, No. WC 2007-0040, 2011 WL 997145, at *11–12 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Mar. 18, 2011).
239 White v. Bernhart, 241 P. 367, 369 (Idaho 1925).
240 Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (Idaho 1973).
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row of trees241 or a pile of logs242 could be enjoined, but an elevator
enclosure could not.243
In addition, after having determined that the disputed structure was
indeed a fence, twentieth-century courts in spite cases insisted, even more
forcefully than their predecessors, that the criterion for an actionable fence
was whether its harms exceeded its benefits; malice-based tests, they
explained, were outdated.244 They became outdated when property law
explicitly espoused the public policy oriented limits to owners’ freedom the
doctrine had introduced under the guise of those malice-based tests. At that
point, spite doctrine in its entirety could be deemed outdated, and
accordingly courts grew reluctant to resort to it at all. Any social ill
previously addressed by spite fence jurisprudence was currently addressed
by zoning laws. Courts were disinclined to employ the spite prohibition to
supplement these laws, even when the owner inarguably acted spitefully. In
the Fontainebleau case, mentioned in the Introduction, Novack’s malicious
intent in blocking the Eden Roc’s pool owned by his former partner was
indubitable. The Florida court still refused to enjoin the spite wall. As it
explained, if Eden Roc were correct in arguing that there were good policy
reasons to halt the wall, it should have persuaded the Miami Beach zoning
authorities to act.245 In Miami Beach, as elsewhere in the twentieth century,
local authorities were constantly balancing competing land uses’ utilities.
There was therefore no need—indeed, there was no justification—for
courts to resort to a spite doctrine that, always caring very little about
actual spite, had allowed such objective balancing when no other authority
was engaged in planning.
In these ways, the spite prohibition in land use was sidelined during
the twentieth century. The authors wedded to the notion of abuse of right,
whose work was reviewed in Part I, ignore this current reality and overstate
spite’s importance in twentieth- and twenty-first-century land use law. At
the same time, paradoxically, they understate spite’s importance to the
emergence of twentieth- and twenty-first-century land use law. The reason
spite occupies a marginal position in the law today—applied, if at all, to
fences alone—is that its true rationale has permeated all aspects of land use
law. Spite was introduced when the law was premised on an owner’s
241

Dowdell v. Bloomquist, 847 A.2d 827, 830 (R.I. 2004).
Dunbar v. O’Brien, 220 N.W. 278, 279 (Neb. 1928).
243 Blair v. 305–313 E. 47th St. Assocs., 474 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
244 See, e.g., Webb v. Lambley, 148 N.W.2d 835, 837–38 (Neb. 1967); Hay v. Stevens, 530 P.2d
37, 40 (Or. 1975); Schork v. Epperson, 287 P.2d 467, 470–71 (Wyo. 1955).
245 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959).
242
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freedom to build. The spite prohibition moderated that freedom through a
requirement that the structure built be socially useful. The prohibition did
not serve to punish ill-meaning owners; it served to enable land use
regulation in an era that knew little such regulation. As the concept of
property evolved, and as spite doctrine’s idea—the idea that social
regulation is imperative—overthrew land use law’s devotion to owners’
freedom, spite doctrine itself became an afterthought. A doctrine that had
heralded property’s redefinition in American law became, due to its
success, a body of law dedicated to divining what is a fence.
C. Spite in Support Rights and in Restraints on Alienation
In water and land use law, a legal category of spite, albeit hardly ever
correlating to the lay category of spite, has played a major role in the law’s
development. In two other property law subfields—support rights and
restraints on alienation—spite technically formed at times part of the law,
but it did not actually play any role in its operation. Lawmakers’ eschewal
from relying on the formally available spite category in these subfields
unsettles the first element of the reigning reading of spite’s function,
reviewed in Part I, which holds that spite is a meaningful, broad concept
restraining owners. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the judicial
inaction on spite in these subfields aid in upending that reading’s other
element: that spite regulates mental states. The legal nonintervention in
these subfields reinforces this Part’s thesis that the spite prohibition was
used to introduce objective, not subjective, balancing into property law
when the law lacked such balancing. The law governing support and
restraints on alienation already, in and of itself, limited the owner’s
freedom of action through objective balancing—and hence in neither did
courts experience an impulse to avail themselves of the spite prohibition.
The first-ever judicial declaration that an act spitefully motivated is
actionable was made not in a water or land use dispute, but in a conflict
over support for soil. Yet not in that case, nor in any other support conflict
that followed, was that prohibition enforced. In their factual underpinnings,
such quarrels over support are reminiscent of those revolving around
underground water. As with conflicts over percolating waters, conflicts
over soil support arise when one owner digs on her land. In debates over
percolating waters, reviewed in Section II.A, the neighbor’s attendant harm
is the resultant lost ability to withdraw water from her land; in debates over
support rights, the harm is the resultant loss of support for her land and its
subsidence or even collapse. Unlike its indifference, expressed through the
Acton Rule, towards neighbors’ complaints over lost percolating waters,
however, the common law never granted the owner the freedom to
398
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excavate with disregard to such harms. Rather, it has historically held that a
neighbor has a “right to have the soil in its natural condition supported by
the soil of adjoining land.”246 Thus all owners are subject to a strict liability
duty not to remove support for their neighbors’ lands.247 The rule clearly
limits an owner’s freedom of excavation, but its phrasing strictly delineates
that limit. The owner will be liable, always, if she excavates and removes
support for her neighbor’s land in its natural conditions.248 Ergo the rule
does not apply if the owner removes support for her neighbor’s
structures.249
Still, as the New York court clarified early on, in 1819, the fact that
the owner is not automatically liable for an excavation removing support
for her neighbors’ structures does not intimate that she can never be found
liable. She will be liable if she acted maliciously.250 The ruling thus
included the first statement in American law that “[i]n the exercise of a
lawful right, a party may become liable to an action, where it appears that
the act was done maliciously.”251 Dramatic as the statement might have
been, however, the ruling also assured that it would carry little effect: the
court added that a defendant charged for removal of support for structures
could also be found liable in malice’s absence—if she acted negligently.252
The move to equate spite with unreasonableness, accomplished only
gradually and implicitly in water law and land use law, was completed
immediately and explicitly upon the introduction of the spite prohibition
into support law. Courts experienced none of the circumspection evident in
those other subfields because, unlike in water law and land use law, the rule
governing support rights never awarded owners absolute freedom; from the
outset, the owner’s right was limited as she could not remove support for
neighboring land in its natural conditions. Some degree of interest
balancing between neighbors was always present, and never questioned, in
support law. Forthrightly expanding such balancing was therefore
uncontroversial and could proceed directly rather than obliquely under the
pretense of spite analysis.
Consequently the prohibition on malicious motives, formally
recognized in New York and elsewhere, has not played any role in support
246 8 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, § 69.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d Thomas ed. 2015),
LexisNexis TORPTE.
247 Tunstall v. Christian, 80 Va. 1, 3 (1885).
248 See Wyatt v. Harrison (1832) 110 Eng. Rep. 320, 322; 3 B. & Ad. 870, 874–76.
249 See Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220, 229 (1815).
250 Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92, 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
251 Id.
252 Id. at 99.
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law. Courts have continued throughout the centuries to list “improper
motive” as a circumstance potentially generating liability for removal of
lateral support for structures.253 However, since they have also
acknowledged negligence as basis for liability,254 these statements have
amounted to little; no case has ever turned on improper motive, and,
moreover, no court has ever investigated an excavator’s motive.255
The spite prohibition met a similar insipid fate in the property law
subfield of restraints on alienation. This body of law limits an owner’s
ability to restrict future transfers of her land. Through a restraint on
alienation, an owner attempts, by terms of her land’s conveyance, to
eliminate successors’ power to transfer the property, or to “lessen the
likelihood of their exercise of this power by stating adverse consequences
of an attempt later t[o] transfer.”256 Due to the social interest in land’s
alienability, English common law held such restraints void as “repugnant”
to the fee.257 In the nineteenth century, American courts adopted this rule.258
Yet it was soon qualified to apply only to unreasonable restraints.
The decisive factor in determining a restraint’s reasonableness was its
extent: whether it was absolute or partial (i.e., qualified in its duration, in
the class of people to whom it bars transfers, etc.).259 Still, courts260 and the
original Restatement261 also listed as unreasonable restraints that were
“capricious” or “imposed for spite or malice.” An example of a restraint
struck down as imposed for spite is found in the Arkansas case Casey v.
253 E.g., Winn v. Abeles, 10 P. 443, 447 (Kan. 1886); McGuire v. Grant, 25 N.J.L. 356, 361 (Sup.
Ct. 1856); Schultz v. Byers, 22 A. 514, 514–15 (N.J. 1891).
254 E.g., Conboy v. Dickinson, 28 P. 809, 810 (Cal. 1891); City of Quincy v. Jones, 76 Ill. 231, 241
(1875). Courts have stressed that the negligence standard applied in these cases may not be as taxing as
in other cases. E.g., Charless v. Rankin, 22 Mo. 566, 574 (1856).
255 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 819 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating that strong
dicta supports the proposition that an excavation is itself unreasonable when made for the sole purpose
of harming another’s premises); F.E.M., Annotation, Liability of One Excavating on His Own Premises
for Resulting Injury to Adjoining Building, 50 A.L.R. 486, § 1(c), at 498 (1927) (“Though there appears
to be no case wherein liability has been actually imposed on this ground, obiter statements to that effect
may be found in a number of decisions.”).
256
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS pt. 2, intro. note, at 143 (AM. LAW
INST. 1983).
257 See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION §§ 18–19, at 9–10 (2d ed., Boston,
Bos. Book Co. 1895) (1893).
258 E.g., Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78, 107 (1874); De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467,
505 (1852). For an overview, see generally Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on
Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1935).
259 See, e.g., Lawson v. Lightfoot, 84 S.W. 739, 740 (Ky. 1905); Munroe v. Hall, 1 S.E. 651, 653
(N.C. 1887).
260 See, e.g., Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 729 (1915); Lawson v. Redmoor
Corp., 679 P.2d 972, 974 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
261 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 406 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1944).
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Casey,262 where a testator devised land to his son subject to the condition
that the son would lose the land if he ever attempted to transfer it to his
daughter (the testator’s granddaughter) or allowed her to stay therein for
more than one week per year.263 Other than in that sole case, however, no
court passing judgment on the reasonableness of a restraint on alienation
ever addressed the caprice and spite factors listed in the early version of the
Restatement, and accordingly they disappear from subsequent
Restatements.
In light of this Part’s findings with respect to other property subfields,
the paucity of cases dealing with spiteful restraints on alienation is readily
explicable. As shown, spite was used to introduce objective interest
balancing where such balancing was missing. The unreasonable restraints
on alienation doctrine always invited courts to engage in an objective
balancing of the competing interests of the owner drafting the restraint and
those affected. There was no need for a spite exception to stealthily open
the door for such balancing. Reasonableness was incorporated into the
doctrine; indeed, into its name. Spite was important in property subfields
where an owner enjoyed uninhibited freedom of action—in water law and
land use law where the Acton Rule and the rejection of the ancient lights
doctrine, respectively, isolated owners from regulation. The appeal to spite
empowered courts to engage in regulation. Once the absolute rule was
replaced with a balancing rule—reasonable use in water law, zoning in land
use—the spite exception faded away. In subfields where the rule always
placed a balancing-based limit to owners’ freedom—in support law and
restraints on alienation—spite was a feeble element of the law throughout.
D. Summary: The Nature of American Spite
Invariably, whether playing a meaningful role in a subfield—by
announcing the demise of absolute freedom rules—or amounting to a mere
trifle in a subfield—where such rules never ascended—at no time did spite
target deplorable mental states. Spite tells us much about ideas of property
in American law, but the lesson it teaches is disconnected from that read by
current commentators. The latter contend, as seen in Part I, that spite is a
general restraint on ownership instituting a mental-state-based test for
judging owners’ acts. Yet the two centuries of American spite, explored in
this Part, illustrate that mental states never set property rights’
boundaries—definitely not in general, but also not in the specific property
law subfields where a spite prohibition was recognized at some point.
262
263

700 S.W.2d 46 (Ark. 1985).
Id. at 47, 49.
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Legal spite in America has had nothing to do with spite; rather, for
centuries it incarnated the irresistible yearning for an assessment of
property uses’ social costs and benefits.
III. WHAT IS WRONG WITH SPITE? SPITE’S NORMATIVE STANDING
Why did courts consistently refrain from employing the spite
prohibition as a mental state test? Was it a justified normative decision or a
mistake? Part II debunked the scholarly consensus that spite is a property
doctrine blocking owners from acting in pursuit of certain desires. It
thereby explained why American law does not investigate or censure Mr.
Markovitz’s motive in erecting the middle-finger statue that launched this
Article. Still, the claim promoted by the many commentators whose work
was reviewed in Part I is not solely descriptive. They insist that property
law bans spite and that it should ban spite. This final Part will argue that
this normative component of the conventional story of spite is as flawed as
its descriptive component: property law not only refrains from prohibiting
spite, it also cannot, and should not, prohibit spite. The law, that is, must
remain indifferent to Mr. Markovitz’s pettiness.
The assertion thus to be made is that spite’s evolution in water law and
land use law, whereby lawmakers transformed the subjective exploration of
owners’ motives into objective analysis of their acts’ utility, is inevitable
and desirable. Property law must be concerned not with intentions, but with
effects. The alternative is logically incoherent and normatively
incompatible with property law’s goals.
The normative argument of commentators embracing that
alternative—i.e., the subjective spite prohibition—is straightforward: the
law ought not empower an owner to act solely to harm another. This
contention’s starting point is the conviction that sometimes an act’s legality
must hinge on the actor’s motivation. As Mitchell Berman succinctly put it:
“Reasons matter.”264 The explanations anti-spite writers provide for why
reasons matter, and more specifically, for why spiteful reasons must be
disqualified, are diverse. Some argue that since the purpose for which
society recognized private ownership is effective use of land, an owner’s
decision to do something with land must be guided by an informed
judgment respecting the land’s desirable use.265 Others contend that since,
in a social system, harms inflicted on others must be morally justified, an
owner knowingly inflicting harm must sincerely believe that there are good

264 Mitchell Berman, Abuse of Property Right Without Political Foundations, 124 YALE L.J.
FORUM 42, 52 (2014).
265 E.g., Katz, supra note 15, at 1450.
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moral reasons backing him.266 Still others employ a Kantian argument: an
owner should not set out to exploit another’s psychic vulnerability, thereby
appropriating that person’s existence, making himself better off than he
would have been had that other person not existed.267 Finally, some rely on
economic analysis to conclude that a spiteful decision is unlikely to
augment overall welfare.268 True, the spiteful owner derives enjoyment
from his victim’s suffering,269 but such subjective enjoyment is hard to
assess. Hence it is impossible to determine whether it outweighs the loss of
enjoyment the victim experiences.270 Even if it does, the costs of
precautions all owners will undertake if spiteful acts are legalized, added to
the costs of the ensuing retaliatory cascade, should prove higher than
whatever enjoyment an owner derives from witnessing his neighbor’s
plight.271
On account of these diverse reasons, commentators believe that an
action motivated by spite alone should be banned. This is an intuitively
attractive rule. It sets, based on moral grounds, a clear line demarking the
permissible in neighbors’ interactions. Appealing as it may be in the
abstract, however, in actuality the rule is inoperable. The attempt to decide
property cases in correspondence to an owner’s motive, separating “good”
or acceptable reasons for action from “bad” or unacceptable ones, is
doomed to fail. It is doomed to fail because bad or spiteful motivations are
inseparable from good or nonspiteful motivations.
This argument, to be established in this Part, topples the normative
case for prohibiting acts motivated by spite alone. It is distinct from two
other claims or problems that merely stress the difficulty in applying the
spite prohibition, but do not render it inoperable or illusory. First, by stating
that spiteful motivations are inseparable from nonspiteful motivations, I am
not simply rehashing the claim made by others that the presence of spite—a
subjective element—in a given case is tough to ascertain.272 The analysis in
this Part assumes throughout that the owner’s spite is incontestable.
Second, my claim that spiteful motivations are inseparable from
nonspiteful motivations is dramatically different, and more daring, than the
266

E.g., Berman, supra note 264, at 53.
Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax Code?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1845–46 (1997)
(book review).
268 Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 224–25.
269 See Mitchell Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 850
(1998).
270 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1864 (1993).
271 Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 224–25.
272 E.g., Epstein, supra note 39, at 97; Farnsworth, supra note 38, at 235.
267
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acknowledged practical problem presented by the owner motivated both by
spiteful and nonspiteful intentions.273 In the cases to be discussed here, the
owner is undeniably solely seeking to harm his neighbor, but that harm
itself also, inherently, delivers to the owner benefits beyond his satisfaction
at the neighbor’s suffering. The nonspiteful motivation is not an additional,
independent motivation. It is part of the spiteful motivation.
Disputes involving business competitors should render this inelegant
pronouncement intelligible and, more importantly, compelling. Hence this
Part will initially develop the argument through those cases. It will then
generalize the argument to all neighbors’ disputes. The distinction between
spiteful and nonspiteful motives will emerge as a formalistic illusion,
diverting legal analysis from its true normative concern: a social
assessment of an act’s effects. This finding’s ramifications for property
theory debates will be addressed in this Part’s closing section.
A. Spite’s Nonspiteful Benefits: The Competition Cases
As advocated by most writers, the prohibition on spite mandates, and
is dependent upon, the singling out of owners acting on spite alone. This
Part of the Article argues that this latter endeavor is forlorn and hence the
normative case for the spite prohibition is hollow. The futility of the
endeavor is most readily apparent in cases where the owner and his spited
neighbor are competitors. Therefore, I will lay the foundation for this
Article’s normative thesis through an examination of those cases.
Many of the spite disputes from water law and land use law reviewed
in Part II involved neighbors who were competitors. For example, the
protagonists of disputes analyzed there counted owners of adjoining resorts
desiring the same percolating waters;274 neighboring owners both seeking to
pump water for sale;275 the hotel owner blocking sunrays from reaching
another hotel’s pool;276 and the shopping center’s owner building a fence to
curtail access to the adjacent shopping center.277 The most common spiteful
conflicts between neighboring competitors, however, which will be
reviewed for the first time now, are disputes over signs. The scenarios in all
these disputes are almost identical. An owner erects on his land, where he

273 Most courts will refuse to find an act spiteful when it is motivated by both spiteful and
nonspiteful motivations. A few will still enjoin the act—if the spiteful motivation was dominant. E.g.,
Hunt v. Coggin, 20 A. 250, 250 (N.H. 1890).
274 Miller v. Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., 40 S.E. 27 (Va. 1901).
275 Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 99 N.W. 882 (Minn. 1904).
276 Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
277 In re Cross County Square Assocs., 133 B.R. 569 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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operates a store, service station, restaurant, or motel, a large advertising
sign whose purpose is to limit passersby’s view of his neighbor’s property,
where the same business is conducted.278 Or the sign’s purpose is to cover
that neighbor’s billboard,279 or to obstruct entrances to his premises.280
Alternatively the owner may place a large showcase blocking pedestrians’
ability to notice goods displayed in the neighboring competitor’s
windows.281
Although the cases are indistinguishable in their material facts—in all,
the owner acted solely to harm his neighbor’s business—they have met
contradicting legal fates. Some courts enjoin the “spite signs.”282 Others do
not.283 This attitudinal difference does not owe itself to disagreement over
the apposite rule. Since the late nineteenth century, when such disputes
arose alongside consumer society, practically all courts have applied to
signs the rule developed in land use, as reviewed in Section II.B.284 Given
that a sign is a structure, and one resembling a fence, the consensus view is
that while normally a sign decreasing neighbors’ exposure to light and air
is not actionable, it becomes actionable if motivated by spite alone.285 Thus
both the sign conflicts’ relevant facts and the rule to which they are subject
are common across cases. Yet courts part ways in their appraisal of the
facts’ ability to meet the rule; courts diverge on whether a sign erected
solely to harm a competitor counts as motivated by spite alone.
While hardly elaborated upon, the underlying problem generating this
disagreement is symptomatic of the inescapable weakness, which this Part
aims to pinpoint, of the normative grounding routinely provided for the
spite prohibition. Specifically, the cases are afflicted by the problem of the
278 E.g., Hutcherson v. Alexander, 70 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1968); Parker v. Harvey,
164 So. 507, 508 (La. Ct. App. 1935); 44 Plaza, Inc. v. Gray-Pac Land Co., 845 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992).
279 E.g., Campbell v. Hammock, 90 S.E.2d 415, 415 (Ga. 1955); Scharlack v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
368 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Rogers v. Scaling, 298 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957).
280 E.g., Parker, 164 So. at 508; Green & Green Co. v. Thresher 83 A. 711, 712 (Pa. 1912);
Maxwell v. Lax, 292 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).
281 E.g., Gallagher v. Dodge, 48 Conn. 387, 389 (1880); Hallock v. Scheyer, 33 Hun 111, 111–12
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1884).
282 E.g., Hutcherson, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 373; McClosky v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 1951);
Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785, 787 (Idaho 1973); Parker, 164 So. at 512; Hallock, 33 Hun at
112–13; Rogers, 298 S.W.2d at 880.
283 E.g., In re Cross County Square Assocs., 133 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); 44 Plaza,
845 S.W.2d at 580; Scharlack, 368 S.W.2d at 707.
284 E.g., Gallagher , 48 Conn. at 392–94; Sundowner, 509 P.2d at 787; Hunt v. Coggin, 20 A. 250,
250 (N.H. 1890).
285 J.W. Thomey, Annotation, Billboards and Other Outdoor Advertising Signs as Civil Nuisance,
38 A.L.R.3d 647, § 2[a], at 650 (1971).
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inseparability of competitive motivations from spiteful motivations, which
renders the term spiteful useless.
Owners in signage cases are unquestionably acting to harm their
neighbors: the spite sign is planted with the sole purpose of impeding
patrons from entering the neighbor’s business, thereby harming the
neighbor’s well-being. Yet the patron impeded from entering the
neighbor’s business will be more likely to patronize the erecting owner’s
business. Any harm to the neighbor represents a benefit to the owner, given
that the two are competitors thrust in a zero-sum game. The benefit
experienced by the owner harming his neighbor through a spite sign is not,
therefore, merely subjective satisfaction from his neighbor’s distress—a
benefit, which, as explained above, many argue must be omitted from legal
analysis.286 The benefit the owner obtains from the spite sign is indisputably
pecuniary: the potential for increased business. Still, that benefit is
generated solely from the harm to the neighbor—from the neighbor’s
potential loss of business. Can the owner thus be characterized as acting
upon spite alone? Upon, that is, a desire to harm without intent to procure a
benefit?
One early court, concluding that the answer must be no, identified
spite’s logical incoherence in this context, but, beholden to limiting legal
theories of the time, only accentuated the problem this Section seeks to
highlight. In 1880 the Connecticut court explained:
So far as [the owner’s showcase blocking the neighboring window display]
was intended to annoy the [neighboring] store it was not so much from malice,
as we ordinarily understand that term . . . as from a spirit of competition in
business—of ill will perhaps—yet not so much against the object of it as an
individual as against him as a rival in business.287

The difficulty in applying the term malice to the owner’s behavior in this
case, and all competition cases, was impossible to ignore. However, the
solution the court provided—the hair splitting between “malice” and “ill
will,” between the neighbor as “an individual” and as “a rival in
business”—only compounded it.
This fine distinction, professing to insulate malice from other akin
intentions, was characteristic of the era’s formalist legal reasoning.288
Similar technical differentiations, which the classical legal thinkers of the
286 See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text; see also Rattigan v. Wile, 841 N.E.2d 680, 687
(Mass. 2006) (stating that the law does not recognize any utility the actor derives from annoying his
neighbor); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (same).
287 Gallagher, 48 Conn. at 394–95.
288 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960, at 17–19
(1992).
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day readily drew, led Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1894 to author his
groundbreaking article289 denigrating judicial reliance on motive in torts.
Holmes’s polemic underlined the meaninglessness of the term spite in the
context of competitive relations and hence it merits attention here.290
Holmes claimed that purported questions about intent reduce to nothing
more than questions of public policy.291 Holmes’s celebrated hypothetical
was of the man who sets up a shop in a small village which can support but
one of the kind, intending to ruin the shop of a deserving widow
established there already.292 The man’s subjective intent is spiteful and
supposedly reproachable, yet no court would enjoin him. The reason,
Holmes argued, was the strong public policy endorsing competition.293 “[I]n
all such cases the ground of decision is policy; and the advantages to the
community, on the one side and the other, are the only matters really
entitled to be weighed.”294
Holmes admitted that perhaps there were instances where the
competitor’s harmful act could not be said to foster competition.295 There,
where the only potential public policy backing the act is the freedom to
spite, motive-based restrictions may become sensible, but “[s]uch a case I
find hard to imagine . . . [thus] there is no need to stay in such thin air.”296
Surprisingly, however, precisely such a case—where the competitor’s spite
could not be said to promote competition—did, at least arguably,
materialize fifteen years later. But even there, the deplorable motive did not
dictate the result—policy considerations did. Hence the case spotlights the
pointlessness of motive explorations.
In 1909 a Minnesota court held liable an affluent banker, entertaining
no particular interest in hairstyling or the financial potentialities thereof,
when he opened a barbershop solely to drive the town’s only barber, whom

289

Holmes, supra note 178.
For more on the debate over the definition of legitimate competition that Holmes was engaging,
see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV.
1019 (1989).
291
See Holmes, supra note 178, at 3.
292 Id.
293 Id. Courts have consistently held that “lawful competition must be encouraged, fostered, and
protected.” Gieseke v. IDCA, Inc., 844 N.W.2d 210, 218 (Minn. 2014); see also, e.g., Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition.”).
294 Holmes, supra note 178, at 9.
295 Id. at 5. Holmes’s iconoclastic theory generated an exchange with James Barr Ames, who
believed that intent is relevant to torts. Ames specifically argued that cases exist where the defendant’s
act could not be viewed as serving the interest of competition. J.B. Ames, How Far an Act May Be a
Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARV. L. REV. 411, 420 (1905).
296 Holmes, supra note 178, at 5–6.
290
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he despised, out of business.297 Nonetheless, this deplorable motive was not
the court’s governing concern. Grading motivations among competitors
was an idle exercise, reckoned the court, which was clearly heavily
influenced by rising realist thinking.298 “We do not intend to . . . become
entangled in the subtleties connected with the words ‘malice’ and
‘malicious.’”299 The failing of the banker’s act was, the court explained, not
its motive.300 It was that inasmuch as the banker was ready to quit the
market after ruining the barber, his opening of the barbershop defeated the
public interest in competition.301
Even in this, the most extreme of cases, Holmes’s insight regarding
the unsuitability of motive tests for the competition torts proved
irresistible.302 It should also inform the evaluation of property disputes such
as those over spite signs. In cases involving competitors, the term malice or
spite, understood as the intent to inflict harm to another without generating
benefits to the perpetrator, is meaningless.303 Competition is always
deliberate, and it is always malicious: “Most businessmen don’t like their
competitors, or for that matter competition. They want to make as much
money as possible and getting a monopoly is one way of making a lot of
money.”304 The actor seeks to harm his neighbor and competitor towards
whom he harbors deep hostility. Concurrently, that wanton harm inflicted
on the neighbor will generate an unquestionably tangible benefit to the
owner. Consequently, it is impossible to ever identify him as motivated by
malice alone—i.e., as spiteful. If some competitive practices—say, certain
signs—are to be prohibited, it thus cannot be due to their objectionable,
spiteful motivations. The inquiry into the objectionable nature of the
competitive practice—here, the sign—must become an inquiry into what
counts as a reasonable competitive practice—in this instance, what counts
as a reasonable sign (in terms of size, design, etc.) in the relevant

297

Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 946, 948 (Minn. 1909).
The court made the quintessentially realist observation: “[G]eneralizations are of little value in
determining concrete cases.” Id. at 947.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 948.
301 Id.
302 The relevant tort was interference with contractual relations.
303 The Restatement notes that “cases recite, mostly in dicta, that one who engages in competition
solely or primarily for the purpose of causing harm to another is subject to liability.” RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1995). In antitrust law, intent is
irrelevant. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“[W]hat has become an antitrust commonplace, that if conduct is not objectively anticompetitive the
fact that it was motivated by hostility to competitors . . . is irrelevant.”).
304 Olympia Equip., 797 F.2d at 379.
298

408

SHOKED (DO NOT DELETE)

110:357 (2016)

2/17/2016 12:24 PM

Two Hundred Years of Spite

geographical area.305 Analyses of “subtleties” associated with the term
spite, such as distinctions between “malice” and “ill will,” merely conceal
the actual policy analysis. They camouflage the task the courts are really
assuming: setting contours for acceptable competitive relations.306
Spite analysis breaks down in cases where neighbors are competitors
since any harm to one is by definition a benefit to another. Intent to solely
inflict harm is also intent to derive a competitive advantage and thus it is a
nonexistent category. The spite sign cases are good examples of this
phenomenon since the contending parties are formally competitors. But
many other disputes reviewed in Part II, where the neighbors were not
identified as business competitors, also implicate—if not overt, then at least
latent—competitive relations.307 They hence suffer from the same analytical
flaw. The owner pumping water away from his neighbor may be harming
his neighbor to improve his own standing in the market for water.308 The
owner blocking her neighbor’s lake views with a spite fence may be
increasing her own property’s value by reducing the supply of desirable
lake houses.309 In all these cases, the insight stands: any settlement of the
dispute cannot be guided by an appraisal of the spitefulness of the actor’s
motive since that motive is always concurrently spiteful and nonspiteful.

305

See, e.g., Hullinger v. Prahl, 233 N.W.2d 584, 585–86 (S.D. 1975).
Competition may have costs and is therefore subject to regulation. For example, the concept of
“wasteful competition” refers to cases where competition leads to duplicate services, reduced safety
standards, etc. The argument that the particular characteristics of an industry might make competition
undesirable will not lead a court to reject an antitrust claim. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–96 (1978). The reason, however, is not that these claims are always factually
untrue or normatively unacceptable, but rather that such a determination was for Congress to make, not
the courts. Id. at 692. And indeed, as administrative law drastically expanded during the New Deal and
thereafter, Congress enabled anticompetitive arrangement designed to combat wasteful competition. An
example is the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938). This act directed
the Civil Aeronautics Authority to approve agreements between carriers “relating to the establishment
of transportation rates, fares, charges or classifications . . . or for controlling, regulating, preventing, or
otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful competition” if “it does not find [the
agreement] to be adverse to the public interest.” Id. § 412, 52 Stat. 1004. Another example of the
relevance of wasteful competition concept to legal regulation is found in patents. See Mark F. Grady &
Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 316–18 (1992).
307 Another way of thinking of some of these cases, which also questions the soundness of
deploring spite, is as cases where one owner had produced a positive externality from which a neighbor
has benefitted without paying (since property law does not mandate payment for such externalities, such
as the ability to enjoy the trees planted on a neighbor’s land or the light coming through it) and is now,
by blocking the neighbor’s access to such benefits, trying to assure payment. For the argument that
moves to contain or reduce beneficial externalities by their producer, though seemingly spiteful and
inefficient, may “serve as precursors to contracts with other benefited parties that will realign the
production of benefits with the receipt of proceeds,” see Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts,
116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1452 (2007).
308 See, e.g., Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 93 N.W. 907, 907–08 (Minn. 1903).
309 See, e.g., Holbrook v. Morrison, 100 N.E. 1111, 1111–12 (Mass. 1913) (involving two
competing real estate developers).
306

409

SHOKED (DO NOT DELETE)

2/17/2016 12:24 PM

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Courts resolve these conflicts through an appraisal of the social desirability
of the specific competitive practice. They reach policy determinations, not
intent findings.
B. Neighbors as Competitors: Ownership, Status, and Spite’s Ubiquity
As the previous Section established, spite is a meaningless legal
category in cases involving business competitors. But can it still perhaps
carry normative weight in regulating the relationship between those owners
who are not business competitors—for example, the Introduction’s Mr.
Markovitz and Ms. Tuohy? This Section will argue that it cannot
realistically be expected to perform even this more modest task—not as
long as property law takes for granted all owners’ ability to engage in some
form of competitive relations. As shall be seen, owners who, unlike the
owners in the preceding Section, are not partaking in competition over
clients may still be, or choose to be, interlocked in competition over status.
Like business competition, status competition is premised upon the benefits
derived from harming others, and, also like business competition, current
law legitimizes it. Ultimately, this Section will argue, all owners are
competitors—or, more accurately, all owners are free to view themselves
as competing with other owners—and thus no owner can be reprimanded
for being spiteful.
To understand why, we must revisit property theory’s first principles,
and specifically, the general rationales backing the owner’s freedom to act
on his property—for example, to build an elaborate structure thereon.310
Such freedom of action promotes overall welfare by incentivizing efficient
development311: individuals may enjoy living in elaborate structures and
thus their construction enhances efficiency. Such freedom of action also
serves individual rights through an expanded realm for autonomy and selfexpression312: individuals may develop their identities through their choice
of elaborate structures. But beyond these utilitarian and right-based goals,
the freedom to use property serves another aim.313
One of property law’s key functions, as Nestor Davidson recently
reminded us, is to enable people to communicate their standing in

310 See generally Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE L.J. 437, 446–52 (2014)
(reviewing the diverse normative reasons for property law’s privileging of the owner’s freedom).
311 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348–49
(1967).
312 See Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1257, 1264–69 (2014).
313 On the distinction between utilitarian and right-based arguments for property, see JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 79–87 (1988).
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society.314 The idea that property confers on its holder a status and social
power is intuitive and hardly controversial.315 In a landmark article, Morris
Cohen memorably characterized property as state-delegated power: “[T]he
law thus confers on me [the owner] a power, limited but real, to make [my
neighbor] do what I want.”316 The freedom to own and use property permits
the owner to convey a message to his neighbor and others respecting his
omnipotence and standing vis-à-vis those others.317 In other words, an
owner can build an elaborate structure to keep up with the Joneses, or to
one-up the Joneses.318
While this signaling function of property may not be a good in and of
itself, it is presumed to advance property’s utilitarian and right-based
functions.319 Overall welfare is normally served when people are motivated
to work to improve their relative standing.320 Furthermore, status pursuit
can be an important component of individual autonomy and selfexpression.321 Of course, the social desirability of reliance on power
relations and hierarchical structures has always been subject to fierce
debate.322 That debate, touching upon broad themes pertaining to the value
of consumerism—and of capitalism itself323—falls far beyond our
discussion’s reach. The debate’s basic premise, shared by all factions,
suffices: the current social and legal system prioritizes individuals’ ability
to pursue status and power through ownership of material goods. A cause
for concern or celebration, this is a fact of modern law. Adam Smith thus
314

Davidson, supra note 28, at 760.
Id. at 775–78 (reviewing property’s history as an institution for the “constant process of
competition and status anxiety” and listing works of thinkers commenting on this fact).
316 Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927).
317 See Edward K. Sadalla et al., Identity Symbolism in Housing, 19 ENV’T & BEHAV. 569, 572–73,
583–86 (1987).
318 See CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 81–128 (1977) (arguing that home
ownership in a “nice” neighborhood is often perceived as the top rung in the long climb up the social
ladder).
319 See Davidson, supra note 28, at 791; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative
Preferences in Property Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157, 2163–64 (2012).
320 Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular
Application to Sexual Harassment, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (1999).
321 See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117, 118–19
(1954).
322 See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST
FOR STATUS 136–37 (1985); Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code,
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 819 (2010); Luis Rayo & Gary S. Becker, Peer Comparisons and Consumer
Debt, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 231, 231 (2006).
323 See TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 87–95 (2002); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 85–86 (Jeffrey C. Isaac ed., Yale Univ. Press 2012)
(1848); THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 16–17, 21–27 (Martha Banta ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1899).
315
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wrote of the “poor man’s son” who in a capitalist system is free to work
more and amass more goods than he truly needs or desires, just to become
visible to others.324 Comparably, in such a system, a Mr. Markovitz is free
to build a large lake house he has no intention to inhabit or to sell for profit,
just to bolster his stature through pressing his ex-wife, a Ms. Tuohy, to
regret jilting him in favor of another who cannot afford such an abode. He
may proceed even in the hypothetical case where in his mind his sole intent
is to pain her through envy, with no regard to his own stature.325 Ownership
encompasses—or maybe is—the power to make others jealous.
Property law empowers an owner to build a fancy mansion to
announce his arrival in the neighborhood and entice envy among
neighbors.326 It enables owners to maintain a golf course in their
community though they do not intend to use it, but want to exude prestige
and social exclusivity.327 Governments sell “vanity plates,” signs meant to
adorn personal properties (cars) catering to one want: the owner’s, well,
vanity.328 All these activities are geared towards assuaging the owner’s ego
or prestige—often at the expense of others’ ego or prestige. An owner
undertaking any such activity may be driven by pure desire to harm others
by downplaying their importance, success, or affluence. But through such
downplaying, the owner boosts his own importance. Status and power are
relative.329 An individual enjoys status by towering over others; power is
wielded over others. Accordingly, an individual’s status and power are
augmented when others’ status and power are denigrated.
In a property system tolerating—indeed embracing—status
competition, the category of spiteful motivations collapses. Intent to harm
another—to lower another’s status—is also intent to benefit the owner—to
increase the owner’s status. In his own eyes, and in those of other public
members, the owner’s stature might improve thanks to the knock sustained
324 ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, pt. IV, ch. I, para. 8, at 211–14 (Knud
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759).
325 An argument has been made that while some tend to assess their wealth and happiness in
relative terms, others tend to do so in absolute terms. For the latter, a decrease in the wealth or
happiness of others will not, arguably, augment their own wealth or happiness. Strahilevitz, supra note
319, at 2159. The facts of the actual incidence, as described in note 4, supra, indicate that Mr.
Markovitz was probably no stranger to relative preferences.
326 See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, In Los Angeles, Vintage Houses Are Giving Way to Bulldozers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2015, at A15.
327 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV.
437, 468–76 (2006).
328 See Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 390–91 (5th
Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239
(2015).
329 J. Sabini & M. Silver, Envy, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EMOTIONS 167, 172 (Rom Harré
ed., 1986).
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by that other. Thus an owner obtains a benefit from such an act in addition
to any subjective enjoyment he derives from witnessing the other’s distress.
As in business competition over clients, in status competition over
standing, an act solely aimed at harming one’s adversary inherently
benefits the actor. The owner may derive personal satisfaction from his
neighbor’s suffering, but the act’s utility for him extends beyond that to
include the permissible benefits of status signaling. An owner’s act can
thence never be said to be motivated by a desire to harm—by spite—alone,
as the supposed prohibition on spiteful acts requires. Therefore, the
regulation of spiteful acts cannot be a regulation of spite. It must be a
regulation of acts.330
Concretely, the legitimacy of an act meant to magnify the owner’s
relative status must revolve around the reasonableness of the means he
chooses and the harm he inflicts—not around his subjective intent. The
Casey case—which, as presented in Section II.C, cannot, by any stretch, be
described as a case of business competition—nicely exemplifies this
inevitable, and desirable, result general to all owners’ relationships. In
Casey, a court struck down as a spiteful restraint on alienation a testator’s
order that his son lose land devised to him if he transferred possession to
his daughter (the testator’s granddaughter).331 Had this result actually owed
to the restraint’s motivation, it would have been baffling given other
elements of the law. In American law, testators are under no obligation to
leave property to their offspring; through property, owners can air their
rancor and domineer family members even posthumously.332 Accordingly,
the Casey testator was free to completely disinherit his son if he were upset
over his relations with the granddaughter. While the devise to the son
accompanied by the restraint on alienation was struck down,333 such
disinheritance of the son would have been upheld.
Why should the disinheritance be deemed less reprehensible than the
restraint? Like the restraint on alienation, the disinheritance would have
been inspired by the testator’s attitude towards his son and granddaughter.

330 In an important article, Richard McAdams explained that the satisfaction of relative
preferences—preference for status or prestige—might sometimes, but not always, lead to efficiency
losses. Hence, though no judgment is passed on the merits of relative preferences, the effects and
potential results of the race for status they induce in specific cases must be regulated. Richard H.
McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 48–70 (1992).
331 700 S.W.2d 46, 47, 49 (Ark. 1985).
332 JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, & ESTATES 556 (9th ed. 2013). The sole exception
is Louisiana, which, as a civil law state, provides a forced share of an inheritance to certain children.
Id.; see also LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (“The legislature shall provide for the classification of
descendants . . . as forced heirs.”).
333 Casey, 700 S.W.2d at 49.
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The acts did not differ in their motivation. They did differ, however, in the
means employed to serve that motivation and in their effects—and it is that
difference that dictates the diverging results.334 The restraint on alienation
troubled the court since it pressured the son to cut ties with his daughter,
and as the court explained,
For public policy reasons, some cases have held that provisions by which the
acquisition or retention of property interests was made to depend on the
separation of parent and minor child were illegal conditions. “A broader
objection has appeared on occasion against any provision which tends to
disrupt or interfere with family relations.”335

Had the testator simply disinherited his son, this consideration would have
vanished. True, the son would have been punished for his relationship with
the granddaughter. But he would not have been spurred to terminate it, and
thus the public policy against interferences with familial relations would
not have provided reason to eliminate the spiteful act. The objection to the
spiteful restraint on alienation was not an objection to the testator’s spiteful
intent, but rather to the specific means through which he expressed it. An
owner cannot be sanctioned for lording it over others because that is an
inherent power accompanying ownership. An owner can be sanctioned,
however, when the particular way in which he flaunts his power generates
harms that are judged, on objective policy grounds, unacceptable.
Property enables competition. It allows owners to view other owners
as competitors and to have society appraise their own standing and worth in
relation to the standing and worth of those others. As long as private
property is recognized as a weapon—perhaps the paramount weapon—in
the social competition over status and power, spite, or at least the
possibility thereof, is built into property. Courts cannot accuse owners, in
such an environment, of engaging in activities whose sole purpose is to
degrade others or lower their standing. By definition, those activities may
also elevate the owner and increase his own standing. Courts will intervene
when the specific activity, or the harm it wreaks, is objectively deplorable.
Since the power to spite is inherent to ownership—since as an owner Mr.
Markovitz is free to build a mansion to display his superiority to his
neighbors or to simply make them jealous—spite is irrelevant as a test to
334 It is possible to argue that in the second scenario the son suffered no harm—he was simply
denied a benefit. The distinction may hold analytical and philosophical strength, see 1 JOEL FEINBERG,
HARM TO OTHERS 31–36 (1984), but it is lacking in practical terms. In both cases the son ends without
land he would have held had the testator not resented his relationship with the granddaughter.
Regardless, even under the alternative account, the reason only one of the acts is censured is not the
distinct motivation, but rather the presence of harm.
335 Casey, 700 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 27.19, at 671 (A. James
Casner ed., 1952)).
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settle property disputes; it cannot determine Mr. Markovitz’s right to erect
a fence or a statue. The experience of American law, reviewed in Part II,
bears out this normative conclusion.
C. The Spitefulness of Ownership and Property Theory
The disconnect between American law’s spite prohibition and actual
spite, revealed in Part II, and actual spite’s normative impotence,
established in this Part, discredit the prevailing assertion, reviewed in Part
I, that spite law performs the supposedly momentous task of regulating
owners’ intentions. Spite law does not, and cannot, represent an idea of
abuse of right; it does not, and should not, ply motives to draw the
perimeters of ownership’s reach. Does this imply that it is unimportant, that
spite does not merit theoretical attention? Once spite sheds its illusory garb
of an exception to property law’s objective underpinnings, it comes across
as less conspicuous. Still, paradoxically, when accurately conceived as
substantiating—rather than subverting—those underpinnings, spite
becomes more significant for the study of American property law.
Specifically, it lends credence to one of the two central property theories
embroiled in a debate over the essence of property. These concluding
paragraphs will explain why, and thereby will employ this Article’s
insights respecting the inherent spitefulness of ownership to refine our
understanding of property as an institution.
For the past two decades, a reinvigorated American property literature
has been cleaved between two competing property conceptions. One
loosely grouped camp of writers, which can be titled “exclusion
theorists,”336 affirms that the heart of property is the owner’s power.
Conversely, a second loosely grouped camp, “relational theorists,”
conceives social relations as constituting property’s nucleus.
Exclusion theorists’ main contention is that property has a unitary
essence. For many of these theorists, that essence is the owner’s right to
exclude others—property’s sine qua non.337 Others emphasize the owner’s
right to use his property, for which a right to exclude is prerequisite.338
336 See also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–40 (2011) (characterizing
such theories as “exclusion-centric”).
337 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 731 (1998).
338 E.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (defining “the right to property” as “a
right to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things”);
Adam Mossoff, What Is Property?: Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 439
(2003) (defining property as comprising “the exclusive rights to acquire, use and dispose of one’s
possessions”); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
617, 618 (2009) (book review) (“Others of us sympathetic to property’s exclusive tendencies prefer to
conceive of property as a right exclusively to determine a thing’s use.”).
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According to exclusion theorists, property has good reasons to stress the
right to exclude. The right facilitates an owner’s ability to make choices
respecting his land, which satisfies a “robust interest in autonomy.”339 It
also serves as an effective notice system facilitating a market’s existence340:
since the right to exclude protects all the varied actions the owner can pick,
it spares society the costly need to specify them.341
Relational theorists remain unpersuaded. They refuse to accord
primacy to the owner’s dominium over an external thing and his attendant
right to exclude others from it.342 The theories addressed here collectively
as relational are diverse—they include progressive property,343 social
obligation,344 human flourishing,345 civic republicanism,346 objective
wellbeing,347 and more.348 In one way or another, however, they all build on
the basic realist notion that property rights are not unitary, absolute rights
over things, but rather bundles of legal relationships between people.349
Current relational theorists supplement this metaphor with a normative
argument. Property rights are about relationships, and their goal is to
promote certain relationships—those deemed socially desirable.350 Hence,
property law often limits owners’ freedom in order to empower others to

339 PENNER, supra note 338, at 49; Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ.
L. REV. 9, 24 (2011) (book review).
340 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1704 (2012).
341 See id. at 1702–03.
342 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742–44 (1986).
343 Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743,
743–44 (2009).
344
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 745, 748 (2009).
345
Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1089, 1089 (2011).
346 William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1991).
347 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property Law,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73 (2003).
348 E.g., Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 654–58 (2006).
349 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–59 (1913).
350 E.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1938 (2005) (arguing
for “an understanding of ownership, not primarily as a means of separating individuals off from each
other, but of tying them together into social groups”).
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sustain
meaningful relationships.351 Examples include public
accommodations law352 and nuisance law.353
Exclusion theorists relegate these and similar elements of the law to
the periphery.354 For them property’s core is, as it must be, the trespass tort,
anointing the owner the land’s sole gatekeeper.355 Thus, as befits a
theoretical dispute about the essential quality of property, the debate
between relational and exclusionary theories boils down to a controversy
over the proper location in the law of limits affixed to an owner’s freedom
so as to promote desirable social relationships: Are such doctrines a
peripheral afterthought or property law’s core?356
It is precisely in answering this key question that the legal standing of
spite can interfere in the debate. At first glance, the traditional reading of
spite’s role in the law, presented in Part I, jells well with relational theories.
A limit placed on ownership and driven by the owner’s intentions serves
the relational account of property even better than other deviations from the
owner’s freedom, such as public accommodations or nuisance, since it is
explicitly grounded in the sentiments the owner feels towards his
neighbors—that is, in the relationship between an owner and others. For
similar reasons, the abuse of rights principle, which loudly declares that the
owner’s right is not absolute, and that its core is not freedom but acceptable
attitudes towards others, forcefully resonates with relational sensibilities.

351

SINGER, supra note 159, at 12.
E.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (showing how the history of public accommodations law
suggests that there are substantial limitations to the classical conception of property as ownership).
353 E.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE 20 (2003) (arguing that owners are always
confronted with nuisance law as a constraint on their ability to freely use their lands).
354 E.g., Epstein, supra note 39, at 74–79 (arguing that nuisance law merely introduces
nonexclusionary considerations for extreme cases); Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original
Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 502 (2009) (arguing that public accommodations laws are
located on the law’s edges).
355 See Merrill, supra note 337, at 734–35.
356 Compare Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 971–88 (2009), with Gregory S.
Alexander, Reply, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 1063–68 (2009). See
also Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1858 (2012) (arguing that
“the right to exclude can no longer be considered the core of private ownership” in light of the
prevalence of governance property); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1419 (2012) (“This strategy [i.e., exclusionists’ confinement of
nonexclusionary rules to the periphery] is doomed to fail because the doctrines that do not comply with
the exclusion principle are in fact not marginal or peripheral to the life of property but deal instead with
some of our most commonplace human interactions regarding resources.”); Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1849, 1891 (2007) (arguing that
“[t]he law of nuisance, landlord–tenant, future interests, servitudes, trusts, private contracting, and
regulation” are “refinements outside of the core of property”).
352
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This reflexive appeal of the abuse of right principle to relationalminded commentators might partially account for the intensifying efforts to
equate spite with an abuse of right principle, as reported in Part I, and to
admonish spite, as outlined in the opening paragraphs of this Part.
Therefore, the failure of both endeavors, as established in this Article,
might strike some as serving to bolster exclusion theories. But in fact,
paradoxically, the exposure of deplorable mental states as a meaningless
legal category in property law, serves, I believe, as strong reinforcement for
relational theories.
Tying an act’s legitimacy to the owner’s attitude towards his neighbor
might come across as the ultimate tool for enforcing a relational approach.
Yet this allure of the spite prohibition for relational theorists is superficial.
A mental-state criterion dictating allowable acts actually avoids the general
practices and aims that relational theories champion. These are
consequentialist theories.357 They are concerned with social values—with
designing property rules that occasion a healthy social system.358 In
contrast, as a motives test, the spite prohibition is backward-looking and
consequence-indifferent.
By definition, a mental-state-based prohibition curtails the role of the
social, objective assessment of property uses’ effects. Often the spite test is
explicitly offered by antirelational, exclusion commentators as a way to
evade policy analysis and the promotion of social well-being through legal
regulation. Richard Epstein endorses it because
[t]he motive test (whatever its weakness) has an apparent dual advantage [in
spite fence cases]: it avoids the open-ended and explicit comparisons of costs
and benefits that are everywhere the bane of the legal system; and it removes
the need to make specific collective determinations about height, shape, color,
and the like, which are again difficult to generate through common law
decisions.359

Other nonrelational scholars, too, argue for the replacement of flexible
policy analysis with clear rules tethering legal results to owners’ mental
states.360 The form of analysis these commentators strive to displace is

357 Gregory S. Alexander, The Public Use Requirement and the Character of Consequentialist
Reasoning, in CONTEXT, CRITERIA & CONSEQUENCES OF EXPROPRIATION (B. Hoops et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2517595 [http://perma.cc/
L8ZB-BC3K] (explaining that human flourishing is a consequentialist theory); Oren Bracha & Talha
Syed, Beyond Efficiency: Consequence-Sensitive Theories of Copyright, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229,
245 (2014) (arguing that such “democratic” and “distributive” theories are consequence-sensitive).
358 See supra notes 343–51 and accompanying text.
359 Epstein, supra note 39, at 97.
360 E.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 319, at 2186–87.
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precisely that coveted by relational theories.361 Relational writers normally
believe that property law must always discharge public policy judgments
grounded in social cost–benefit analysis because property is unfailingly
social.362 Land, they explain, is a limited resource registering all activities
owners make and thereby setting the contours for others’ interactions.363
Emphasizing the reasoning leading an individual owner to pick an
activity, rather than the activity’s effects on land and on others, ignores
property’s special nature. In a different context, Hannah Arendt once noted
“[t]he reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact
that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by
which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the
lives of their authors.”364 A focus on the author–actor, which may be
normatively requisite in other legal fields,365 ignores this special nature of
property law’s subject matter.366 This focus’s deficiencies are sometimes
practical and easy to discern. Since the actor may not last as long as his
activity’s effects, the intent behind the activity may recede into the
shadows, while its effects endure. For example, the owner who built a
fence spitefully motivated may be gone, replaced by an owner rather fond
of his neighbor, yet the fence remains. Can it still be removed as a spite
fence? Does spite “run with the land”?367 As legal realism’s progeny,
relational theories would discard this metaphysical question, preferring
instead a concrete evaluation of the fence’s everlasting objective harms and
benefits.368

361

See Nadav Shoked, Response, Property’s Perspective (or of Whom To Be Jealous), 161 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 118, 130 (2013).
362 E.g., Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1299
(2014) (“Property institutions not only regulate the complexity of human interaction, but also shape the
character of those interactions. Property is not only about the allocation of scarce resources, the
management of complex information, or the coordination of land use among competing users; it is
about our way of life. . . . Property is about the social order . . . .”).
363 E.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829–32 (2009).
364 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 95–96 (2d ed. 1998).
365 For an argument that motives should be considered in criminal law, see Janice Nadler & MaryHunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255
(2012).
366 See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 126–27
(2003) (explaining that claims for property rights are unique among rights claims, such as freedom of
speech, because they tend to involve the use or control of physical, external, finite things, and hence
they do not enjoy the same presumptive power across a broad swath of cases as other rights claims do).
367 Running with the land means that the right or obligation passes automatically to successive
owners. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(1)(a), at 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
368 The most famous realist assault on such questions is Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
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The fact that spite doctrine concerned itself with this form of analysis
throughout American legal history, as seen in Part II, thus reinforces
relational theories. It proves that property law is about ownership’s social
nature, and not about the individual owner—neither his mental states, nor
his freedom of action cherished by exclusion theories. American spite
serves as factual testimony to the relational claim that legal decisions
respecting property rights involve a calculation of costs and benefits.
Exclusion theorists may plausibly persist in the stance that the interest
balancing introduced through spite in the nineteenth century merely
represented peripheral “refinements” to the general owner freedom rules
respecting water law and land use at the time.369 Still, the fact that in
different subfields—water law, land use, support rights, restraints on
alienation—whenever the law heroically attempted to concentrate
decisionmaking powers in the owner, it always eventually had to retreat
and introduce refinements—through spite doctrine or otherwise—
incarnates the irresistible draw of interest balancing. In this story of spite,
we find vindication for relational theorists’ normative claim that the
owner’s freedom must be limited.
In addition, our exploration of spite supplies this normative stance
with yet another, new rationale. Property, as seen in this final Part of this
Article, always contains the seed of spitefulness. Harms to others, as well
as a desire to harm others, may accompany all and any acts of the owner.
This observation does not, of course, provide reason to ban all owners’
acts. It does, however, press the need for close monitoring of the social
costs and benefits of those acts. The American law of spite embodies the
realization that spite towards others is an inherent component of property in
a capitalist society. But while it would be counterproductive therefore to
ban malicious motives, it would also be dangerous to let owners do as they
please with the limited, shared resource that is land. Owners’ conduct must
be regulated—but in accordance with the marks that that conduct leaves on
the outside world, not in accordance with the owners’ motivations.
The exploration of American spite law’s history and logic confirms
that property law rejected both an emphasis on the owner’s freedom and on
his subjective mindset. It always tamed rules privileging the owner’s
freedom through the introduction of social considerations—as relational
property theories command.

369 “Refinement” is the role to which these theorists confine balancing. Merrill & Smith, supra note
356, at 1891.
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CONCLUSION
Is there something wrong with the middle-finger statue Mr. Markovitz
erected? And had he alternatively opted to erect a fence, should there have
been something wrong with that fence? The answers may be debatable, but
this Article shows that there could be no debate that they must have nothing
to do with Mr. Markovitz’s wretched motive—whether it gave rise to a
statue or to a fence. The law on the books often suggests otherwise, and so
do legal commentators, but American property law in action never targeted
spiteful acts on account of their motives.370 Spite did play a constitutive part
in the emergence of modern property law in the nineteenth century—across
different key subfields such as water and land use—but not as a subjective
test. Rather, spite was a beachhead for objective balancing tests assessing
the reasonableness of means employed by owners to exercise their rights.
Such balancing is normatively indispensable, whereas a subjective test is
normatively wanting. There might be good reasons to hold that an owner
such as Ms. Tuohy should not be exposed to aesthetic harms,371 or that she
should be able to continuously enjoy exposure to light and air.372 But these
reasons are grounded not in a judgment respecting acceptable and
unacceptable individual motives for action, but rather in a judgment
respecting acceptable and unacceptable social harms. The tastelessness of
Mr. Markovitz’s motive is legally, and normatively, irrelevant. The
tastelessness of Mr. Markovitz’s structure might be legally, and
normatively, relevant.

370 See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910)
(“[D]istinctions between law in the books and law in action . . . will appear, and it will be found that
today also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a very
deep one.”).
371 For arguments supporting the recognition of aesthetic nuisances, see Raymond Robert Coletta,
The Case for Aesthetic Nuisance: Rethinking Traditional Judicial Attitudes, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 141
(1987).
372 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 184–85 (Wis. 1982).
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